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TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS-A REPLY
EDWIN BORCHARD"
THE authors of the articles under reply, Messrs. McDougal and
Lans,' have, like McClure, essayed to show that the treaty and the
executive agreement are interchangeable, and, since executive agree-
ments are simpler to conclude, they advocate disregarding as obsolete
the treaty-making power, requiring, as it does, the consent of two-
thirds of the Senate, and substituting for it the use of the executive
agreement. In that demand they differ radically from the constitu-
tional conclusions which the writer, as well as many other students
of the subject, have reached.
To give their proposal a more "democratic" tinge, the authors
propose what they call the Congressional-Executive agreement,
t Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
The authors of the opus under reply, in contesting my generally accepted view that the
President has only limited powers in making executive agreements and that the treaty-
making power has not become the secondary wreck-"a vermiform appendix"-which the
authors portray, feel it incumbent upon themselves to explain my views on the treaty and
the executive agreement by reason of my general views on foreign policy. Apart from the
fact that I should prefer to be my own interpreter instead of being represented by discon-
nected passages quoted or, more generally, paraphrased, out of context by hostile critics,
my views on foreign policy have no relation, so far as I know, to my views on the treaty-
making power. Nor can conclusions reached after thirty-five years of professional contacts,
official and unofficial, with many of the governments of Europe and Latin America be
characterized as merely "preconceptions." These latter have long been entertained, though
I never knew before that a person who favors economic agreements, especially commodity
agreements, became stamped as a "neo-Marxist." No effort will be made in replying to
their article to make reference to the caustic personal remarks which the authors indulge.
In undertaking the Herculean task of showing that the executive agreement and the
treaty have become interchangeable and in supporting the McClure view [WALLACE MC-
CLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS (1941) ] that anything can be done by
executive agreement or the suggested Congressional-Executive agreement that heretofore
has been done by treaty, the authors have consumed over 200 pages. In presenting tile
traditional view sustained by such authorities as Moore, Dodd and Hyde, I required 19
pages. While the authors' research is commendable, it would hardly have been required
had the contention advanced by them represented an obvious or generally comprehended
position. Nor would a constitutional amendment as proposed by the House Judiciary Com-
mittee have been required or been debated in May 1945 with only derogatory references to
the executive agreement. The alleged "complete certainty" by which they support the
interchangeability of the two methods of binding the United States is engaging. I shall
endeavor to demonstrate its palpable invalidity. The reader will, I trust, pardon my occa-
sional use of the pronoun of the first person, since the articles under reply are a challenge of
myself and an article that I ventured to write entitled Shall the Executie Agreement Replace
the Treaty? (1944) 53 YALE L. J. 664 (hereinafter cited as 53 YALE L. J. 664).
1. Hereafter referred to as the authors or the gentlemen. The article under reply,
Treaties and Congressional-Executire or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Insiril-
ments of National Policy, will be cited as Treaties.
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which, as a Congressional approval of executive agreements already
made, has no roots in history, but is deemed by the authors to stand
on an equally good footing with the executive agreement concluded
pursuant to an act of Congress, of which there are illustrations in the
postal and tariff agreements concluded ever since early days in the
case of postal agreements and since 1890 in the case of tariffs. The
authors maintain that they are justified in advocating this step by
reason of the alleged defects of the treaty-maldng pover and by the
fact that a "usage" has grown up not only in favor of the Congress-
sponsored executive agreement but in favor of the agreement con-
cluded by the President under his independent powers as Commander-
in-Chief and diplomatic representative of the United States, from
which they draw the inference that the executive agreement which is
Congressionally approved-by simple majority-is a generous conces-
sion to the doubters of the consequences of a broad executive power.
The gentlemen begin their thesis with an analogy between the con-
stitutional treaty and the executive agreement, by positing the sup-
posed plenary power of Congress 2 to deal with all aspects of foreign
affairs,3 in spite of the fact that a constitutional amendment, dis-
cussed May 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9, 1945,4 -as deemed by the Judiciary Com-
mittee of the House of Representatives 5 to be necessary in order to
give the House a voice in treaty-maldng. They then observe that the
Congress has conferred on the President the power to make numerous
executive agreements, notably in the field of tariffs, the mails (Post-
master General), copyright, trademarks, and on a variety of other
subjects within the power of Congress.c They also observe that the
2. Elsewhere it is admitted that the power of Congrezs may be limited. McDougal
and Lans, Treaties, at 317, 338, 346. Yet it is asserted that Congress has "plenary" powers
"to implement valid agreements." Id. at 233 (note 104); see also id. at 241 ("rezidual Con-
gressional authority to legislate in the field of foreign relations"), 259 ("inherent powers to
control international relations" under the Articles of Confederation). If the powers of Con-
gress are really plenary, why is it that the St. Lawrence project, the Anglo-American oil
agreement and the aviation agreements were not accepted as e-xecutive agrcements ap-
proved by Congress? Why did the Senate protest in any of these cases?
3. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 241,310,314-5.
4. 91 Cong. Rec., May 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9, 1945, at 4079 cl seg., 4109 el seg., 4314 el sc2.,
4398 el seq., 4414 el seg.
5. H.R. ReP. No. 2061, 78th Cong., st SL. (1944).
6. U.S. CoxsT. Art. I, § 8. The effort attributed to me (,McDougal and Lans, Treaslis,
at 199) "to exclude from the domain of 'executive agreements' all agrements ... effccted
by the President pursuant to the authorization . . . of Congress," is squarely contradicted
by pages 671-3 of my article in 53 YALE L. J. They repeatedly attribute to me "a broad:ide
condemnation of all 'executive agreements' " (McDougal and Lans, Trealies, at 203, note 32)
which has no foundation. It was expressly conceded that the daily wor: of the Dcprtmcnt
of State required in the President's independent capacity as a diplomatic officer the con-
clusion of numerous executive agreements. See 53 YALE L. J. 664, 671-3; Hcarings L.cre a
Subcommittee of the Commitee on Commerce on S. 13S5, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) 18O-1.
This charge is occasionally tempered by calling it "an innuendo or half-explicit assumption"
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President may, by virtue of his own independent power as Commander-
in-Chief and diplomatic officer, conclude numerous executive agree-
ments, such as claims settlements, modi vivendi, provisional arrange-
ments pending a treaty, protocols of agreement on particular diplomatic
affairs, and even in late years a number of agreements with or without
a time limit on subjects that cannot be considered unimportant.
They then maintain that since the Constitution leaves executive
agreements unmentioned, it naturally draws no line between the sub-
jects appropriate to treaties and to executive agreements; I hence an
arrangement or understanding on any subject can be called a "treaty" I
but, since it need not be submitted to the Senate, it may be included
within the framework of an executive agreement. They then propose
that since these things must be conceded to be valid, a conclusion by
no means accepted, it is only a slight step to permit the President to
make' any executive agreement he desires and if Congress approves it,
directly or indirectly, it becomes binding as law, national and inter-
national, so that the treaty-making power has become a needless en-
cumbrance, a "vermiform appendix" I which can be dispensed with
as useless.
To reinforce their case the gentlemen usually speak of "authoriza-
tion and sanction" in the same phrase, meaning that if an executive
agreement is "authorized" by Congress (authorization is not an accu-
rate word) why cannot Congress "sanction" a Presidential agreement
after he takes the initiative? 10 The sorry result of such a recent effort,
(McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 216); again, it is "a non-expressed exclusiveness" (id. at
224). Obviously the gentlemen's suggestion that the treaty-making clause in the Consti-
tution was not "exclusive," is a straw man of the type frequently set up by the gentlemen.
When they suggest (id. at 202) that the making of treaties requires "the validation or
approval of the agreement by the appropriate constitutional authority," they fail to note
the distinction between the Senate and Congress. They assume it to be agreed that the
Congress can "validate" agreements negotiated by the President as the law of the land.
That is supposed to be "obvious."
7. The authors say (id. at 195-6), ". it seems clear that the practices and doctrines
of international law neither afford any criteria for distinguishing between treaties and execu-
tiye agreements nor attach to such a distinction any differences in legal consequences." This
is elusive. We are discussing the distinction in constitutional, not international, law. The
fact that no line between them is drawn in the Constitution gives proponents of the execu-
tive agreement an ostensible springboard. But practice has indicated the proper limits of an
executive agreement and the subjects and conditions customary for treaties. In case of
doubt, the Senate should and does often assert its prerogatives, as in the cases of the oil
agreement (see infra, p. 634) and the Connally Resolution, Nov. 5, 1943.
8. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 196-7, 318. Briggs and Hyde, out of context, are
cited in support (id. at 319). Would this not prove that the treaty-making power controls
or should control all agreements? The authors fail to make a parallel heading: "The Execu-
tive Agreement in Constitutional Law."
9. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, Part II, at535.
10. The effect of dealing with Congressional-Executive and Presidential agreements in
one phrase as the authors do (McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 194, 195, 216, 217, 226, and
[Vol. 54: 616
EXECUTIVE AGREEMEINTS-A REPLY
unique in character, in the case of the St. Lawrence project n carries
with it no note of caution for the gentlemen, but the dictum in the
Belmont case and the decision in the Pink case, presently to be dis-
passirn), is to claim for the independent executive agreement broad power nov admittedly
limited, but often asserted to be unlimited, for which there is claimed to be a "usage," and
then to transfer that claim to the unprecedented Congressional-Executive agreement which
the authors propose, for which there is obviously no "usage." They never draw a line be-
tween them. The latter presumably is to occupy the field left unoccupied by the indepnd-
ent agreement. The authors vacillate considerably. It seems sometimes that the Prsident's
independent power to make executive agreements is capable of indefinite expansion Oid. at
251), but, if there are doubts, Congress in its control of foreign affairs (id. at 241) can supple-
ment the President and make the power complete. So, vice versa, if the power of Congress is
considered to have any limits (see id. at 317, 33S, 346), the President can supplement it and
make it complete (see id. at 251). The suggestion that the Congress may "authorize" the
President to make certain agreements within definite limits (having to do mainly with
foreign commerce, tariffs or the mails) affords no precedent at all for the authors' conclusion
that not only in these but in otler fields of foreign affairs (presumably outside the scop2 of
the independent Presidential agreement) Congress may "sanction" any agreements he
might make. This is an obvious non-sequitur and a contradiction of the treaty-mading
clause of the Constitution. Yet the proposal that the President make the agreement first in
his supposed control over foreign affairs and then obtain the consent of a majority of Con-
gress is understood to be the main point of the authors' suggestions.
11. The executive agreement of March 19, 1941, was almost the same as the treaty
signed July 18, 1932, submitted to the Senate on Jan. 19, 1933, and rejected March 14,
1934, by vote of 46 to 42. The agreement purported to receive approval, with other provi-
sions, in the Aiken bill, introduced in the Senate Sept. 28, 1943 (S. 1385), defeated Dec. 12,
1944, by 56 to 25, 14 not voting (90 Cong. Rec., Dec. 12, 1944, at 93S2).
A more plausible illustration of the gentlemen's thesis, though they fail to mention it,
might be found in the reciprocity agreement with Canada of 1911. This related, however, to
tariffs, a traditional subject of House jurisdiction. President Taft sent a meszage to Con-
gress and explained his reciprocity program, got the informal acquiescence of the Congrczz,
made his reciprocity agreement with Canada, and sent it to Congress as "a propozed ar-
rangement." Congress passed the proposal, with approval of similar reciprocity agreemento,
and then Canada refused to accept it. See 5 HAcrwoslii, DiGEST or IITEfl;ATIO.AL LAWV
(1943) 416, 417. But if the intention is to bind the United States legally, including future
administrations of different political complexion, it is believed that it is desirable for a
foreign country to insist upon a treaty in the constitutional sense. Without repeating any
of the arguments presented in my original article in the September 1944 Yale Law Jurr.,
an explanation is there afforded not only why circumstances have forced the Executive to
conclude numerous independent executive agreements but why some cf them have had to
be "important," like armistices. 53 YALE L. J. 664, 670. Tacit acquiezcence of the Senate
in such temporary arrangements was presumed. But there is a somewhat indefinite limit
to what can be done by the Executive alone in dealing with important international mattcrz.
See McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 137.
I must disclaim the distorted version of what purports to be my view of American
foreign policy presented by the authors (id. at 19-92, including note 31). Nobody of any
authority, of whose name I am aware, has ever suggested the possibility of the United
States shutting itself behind "Jericho-like walls"; the Founders of this country were and
their academic followers have been as ardent promoters of foreign trade as Mr. Cordell Hull.
On the other hand, I have some question whether collective security, with or without uni-
versal intervention, is more than an unrealizable dream. The difference bet%%een aspiration
and policy was one of the grounds of the Supreme Court in invalidating NIRA in the Sdich-
ter case, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
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cussed, 12 are to them persuasive that an executive agreement has now
miraculously achieved the same status as a treaty.13
In order to avoid any possibility of misrepresenting the gentlemen's
position, I quote the major elements of their thesis, with a brief com-
ment of my own. They say:
"What is completely certain is that the powers of the Congress
can be superadded to those of the President, and that the two sets
of powers taken together are plenary." "
Thus, two limited powers, each of which leaves large gaps, when added
together-which is directly contrary to precedent-become plenary
powers. This seemed unknown to any member of Congress participat-
ing in the debates on the proposed constitutional amendment, May 1,
2, 7, 8 and 9, 1945.
"Nor would it appear that any effective question can be raised
about the powers of the whole Congress and the President either to
frame policies for controlling the conduct of negotiations or to
make any agreements concluded the law of the land." 1
This rests on assertion, but if designed to claim that the Congress can
approve or ratify any or all agreements of the President, it is con-
trary to the evidence. The gentlemen assume as an undisputed premise
what they must prove as a conclusion.
Because "the powers of the Federal Government are ample to deal
with any problem" of international relations,"0 the conclusion is drawn
that the President can make any treaty or agreement he likes, with
Congress if necessary. An executive agreement is said to be "entirely
upon a par with the treaty," on a "par in every respect." 11 But the
Pink case did not say this; the conclusion is a non-sequitur and rests
solely on assertion.
"... throughout our history . . . international agreements" other
than treaties are said to have been made "on all important subject
matters" with identical consequences as in the case of treaties.'8 This
is an assertion, not a demonstration, and will be disproved presently.
12. Infra, pp. 646-8.
13. While every treaty is an agreement, it is submitted that not every agreement is a
treaty.
14. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 246.
15. Id. at 222. Negotiation, in the authors' view, seems to include the making of agree-
ments. That would give the President unlimited powers, since he is, or can be, the sole
negotiator of treaties. Congressional action in guiding his policies in negotiations could have
only persuasive force. See id. at 187-8. If the President has the option of selecting the
method of obtaining consent, why can Congress "question the procedure" (id. at 188)?
16. Id. at 260.
17. Id.at261,286. Seealsoid.at225-6.
18. Id. at 226.
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It could be said that some matters have uniformly been the subject of
treaties.
". .. the other relevant clauses of the Constitution [besides the
'treaty-making' clause] granting powers to the Congress and the
President . . . are meaningful only if they include the authorizing
or sanctioning of international agreements." 1
In other words, Article I, Section 8, and Article II of the Constitution
have no meaning, the gentlemen suggest, if they do not authorize or
sanction international agreements. This is a non-sequitur.
". .. hundreds of precedents confirmed by interpretations of
Supreme Court Justices, Presidents, and Congressmen, and extend-
ing throughout the 150 years of our national history . . . sustain
the use of Congressional-Executive and Presidential agreements
as alternatives to 'treaties'. . . ." -
One might suspect that this is slightly rhetorical; the Congressional-
Executive agreement as a ratification of prior agreements is unlmown
in practice; the Presidential agreement is admittedly limited in scope, 1
and hence could not be the alternative to a treaty.
Congressional-Executive agreements are not only those authorized
by Congress within their authority, but "sanctioned by the Congress
after the fact of negotiation." 22 This is the authors' thesis. No evi-
dence or practice supports the theory; if it is an agreement, not con-
clusive but subject to approval by Congress, it collides head-on with
the function of the Senate. Moreover, would the authors include all
agreements, or only those-necessarily limited-within the President's
independent powers? If the latter are excluded, which do they in-
clude?
"[There is] an agreement-making procedure under the control,
in some instances, of the Congress and the President, and, in other
instances, of the President alone."
both constitutional practice and decision for 150 years and the
words of the constitutional document itself," it is added, "completely
confirm this view." 23 There is no connection, it is submitted, betwveen
the powers conceded to vest in Congess and in the President and
the authors' claim of Congressional power to raify Presidential agree-
ments.24 The examples given by Wright and others are far from prov-
19. Id. at 212 (emphasis supplied). See also id. at 187, 199, 248, and tassim.
20. Id. at 212.
21. See id. at 187, 255, 311,317 (text and note 43).
22. Id. at 204.
23. Id.at211.
24. I am unaware of any opponents of the "Congrez:ional-E:iecutive" agrccment,
confined to action by Congress within its limited powers in "authorizing" the Prc.sdcnt to
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ing that the power of Congress over foreign affairs-including agree-
ments-is unlimited. 25
The authors say:
". .. the use of executive agreements and treaties as inter-
changeable instruments for effecting international agreements has
an unimpeachable constitutional status and dignity." 25
And yet we learn that
". .. the legal consequences of consummation of international
engagements by treaties or by Congressional-Executive agreements
are all but indistinguishable with respect to both binding effect andduration . . .. " 27
This admits some difference, which is infinitely greater than that ad-
mitted by the word "interchangeable." The authors add,
"It is certain, however . . . that agreements made under the
President's own constitutional powers, and intended to be binding
on the contracting States and to have a reasonably durable life,
share most of the characteristics and have legal effects not very dis-
similar from the Congressional-Executive agreement and the
treaty." 28
make agreements. But the authors include therein (id. at 204) the power of Congress to
ratify agreements, called "sanction" or "approve" or "validate"-but not to change with
any controlling effect on the President (id. at 208-9)-and to that there is an overwhelming
objection. The power to "make agreements" (id. at 202, 222) not only has no constitutional
foundations; it squarely contradicts the treaty-making power. When the Framers meant
Congress to have control-as over interstate compacts-they seem to have said so.
25. Most of the important agreements mentioned by Wright have been "authorized"
by Congress. See Wright, The United States and International Agreements (1944) 38 AM. J.
InT. L. 341, 343, citing McClure. The reciprocity agreements under the Tariff Acts of 1890
and 1897 were "authorized" by Congress. The UNRRA agreement involved consultation
with the Senate and was subject to change because included in the bill (see infra, p. 635).
The Albanian Agreement of 1922 was concluded pursuant to a tariff act. Those mentioned
by Wright in The United States and International Agreements, loc. cit. supra, were entered
into under authority of Congress, except that Texas and Hawaii were annexed by joint
resolution of Congress, not by executive agreement. (The exchange of resolutions or the
supposed offer and acceptance was not a signed agreement.) The Knox-Porter Resolution
of July 2, 1921, ended the war legally for domestic purposes only and was followed by the
Treaty of Berlin. The ILO was joined by the President after unanimous vote of Congress;
other unions were joined under authority of Congress. The Litvinov assignment is discussed
hereafter (infra, p. 646). The no-separate-peace was made by the President under the war
power. The acquisition of naval blses by the Executive became valid when Congress ac-
cepted them. Some topics, like the settlement of claims, are within the jurisdiction of both
branches of the Government, the Executive and Congress. Either may act, but the Presi-
dent practically never submits to arbitration a claim the award in which is likely to call for
appropriations from Congress. See WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS (1922) 244.
26. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 306.
27. Id. at 307 (emphasis supplied).
28. Id. at 307-8 (emphasis supplied). See also id. at 216 ("most of the important
problems of peace and war").
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While probably intended as an argument for executive omnipotence,
it concedes that the class is limited and that the Presidential agreement
has some effects different from the treaty.
"In the Belmont and Pink cases the Supreme Court has ex-
pressly extended the doctrine of Missouri v. Holland to Presidential
agreements in language which is broad enough, if it is needed, to
cover Congressional-Executive agreements." 0
This is true only in so far as the Litvinov assignment, like the migratory
bird treaty, was held to prevail over state law. The statement has no
other validity, it is submitted.
". .. a realistic application of the separation of powers doctrine
might in some situations appropriately permit the President to dis-
regard [a previously.enacted statute on a subject within his special
constitutional competence] as an unconstitutional invasion of his
own power." -"
This has not been put to the test; the opposite, that the executive
agreement must yield to an act of Congress, is the uniform practice.
". .. international tribunals and students of international
law have long repudiated the shadowy distinction between treaties
and other types of agreements . . . ." 31
I know few students of international law who repudiate the distinction.
The distinction is made by consitutional law, but, by reason thereof,
it has important international effects.12
29. Id. at 314-5.
30. Id. at 317. See also id. at 33S, 346-7. Wright is quoted (id. at 246) as having main-
tamined that the President's power is "plenary." McClure apparently leaves this op2n but
does not deny it. The authors vacillate between an open affirmation (id. at 250-2, 260) and
an implicit denial (id. at 187).
31. Id.at31s.
32. Nations may contract international obligations in various forms, with different
effects. In distinguishing treaties, mentioned in the Constitution three times, from the
executive agreement, never mentioned, we are dealing with a purely constitutional izre.
See McDougal and Lans, Treaties. at 196. That is why Mr. Berle, A&:stant Secretary of
State, insisted to the Canadian Government that the additional diverzion of waters from
Niagara Falls (U. S. Exnc. AGREEM'T SErL Nos. 209 and 223) constituting a modification of
the Treaty of 1909 with Canada, required submission to the Senate, upon the con-ent of
which the agreement was made and ratified. The authors' effort to show that a treaty and
an executive agreement are of the same character and are interchangeable admits the differ-
ence in the nature of the two instruments but seeks to give them an identical effect nationally
and internationally.
When the authors admit, as they are obliged to do, that the President has powers only
when acting "within the scope of his independent powers" (McDougal and Lans, Treiaes,
at 199) and that his emecutive agreements have "substantially" the same status as treaties,
the assertion that this is true "under both international law and the municipal law of the
United States" is necessarily unwittingly misleading-treaties cannot be terminated uni-
laterally at will-and the admission that the executive agreement is limited would -em to
admit away the case for interchangeability.
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II
To prove that the authors' reasoning involves a fatal fallacy and
that it is unwittingly unsound and impractical, the following pages
have been written. On the practical side, apart from the fact that other
opponents of the two-thirds rule, including The New York Times, Pro-
fessor Colegrove, and some members of the House of Representatives,
regard the independent -executive agreement, recently expanded be-
yond its normal, admitted functions, as not "honest," 11 an "evasion
of the Constitution," 14 a "subterfuge," 11 a "circumvention of the
Constitution," 36 it must be obvious that no great number of Senators
will be found to vote for the proposed Congressional-Executive agree-
ment, a device conceived to bring about the demise of the Senate's
treaty-making power. Indeed, little in the recent history of politics
justifies any belief in the theory that the Senate will or can voluntarily
participate in the termination of its constitutional functions as the
coequal partner in the making of treaties, or that it will silently acqui-
esce in the encroachment of an ambitious Executive upon its functions.
This is not to deny that Congress has a considerable and undefined
power in the field of foreign relations under the "necessary and proper"
clause. We have seen this power in operation in the Act of 1798 de-
claring limited hostilities with France, in the authorization or declara-
tion of embargoes, in the annexation of foreign territory, in the Panama
Tolls Act and its repeal, and in the so-called Neutrality Acts of 1794,
1818, 1935, 1937, 1939. But this is far from admitting the authors'
thesis, as it is understood, that Congress can authorize the Executive
to make any agreement in any department of foreign affairs, and that
in the absence of advance authorization, it can approve, by joint
resolution of Congress, what he has concluded definitively or tentatively.
Not only does an approved usage establish that a large number of
subjects have been customarily dealt with by treaty, but it is sub-
mitted that the encroachments on the treaty-making power of recent
years made by executive agreement cannot be blindly accepted as
33. N. Y. Times, April 17, 1944, p. 22, col. 1. See also N. Y. Times, May 22, 1944,
p. 18, col. 2.
34. COLEGROVE, THE AMERICAN SENATE AND VORLD PEACE (1944) 31, 110. See also
53 YALE L. J. 664, 677, n. 44. Those who, like the writer, support the Constitution do not
favor "minority control" of foreign affairs. Cf. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 187, 188,
190, 192, 210, 211,226, 227, and passim.
35. Mr. Gossett of Texas in 91 Cong. Rec., May 1, 1945, at 4082.
36. Mr. Kefauver of Tennessee, 91 Cong. Rec., May 2, 1945, at 4111; Miss Sumner,
id. at 4137. Said Mr. Celler of New York, another proponent of the amendment: "But such
procedure [i.e., the executive agreement] is not wise nor is it healthy." Id. at 4117. See also
Mr. Baldwin, id. at 4129 ("bypassing" the Senate, people, or Constitution); Mr. Wadsworth,




evidence of an established usage. 7 Attorney General Jackson in the
"destroyer deal" legal opinion of August 1940 indicated that a line of
division could be found in the criterion whether the transaction could
be immediately consummated or imposed future obligations upon the
legislature, to which the Executive could not commit the country. The
former, an executed act and requiring no legislative commitment, when
performed in his function as Commander-in-Chief, he believed might
be concluded by executive agreement; the latter, the imposition of
future obligations, required a treat,. But wherever the line is drawn,
in case of doubt, and in the event that there should be any substantial
opinion in the Senate insisting that the arrangement should be made
by treaty, no President should hesitate in adopting the method pro-
vided in the Constitution of seeling Senate approval instead of rezolv-
mng the doubt in his own favor.
To make the Congressional-Executive agreement a reality and make
the whole Congress rather than the Senate a partner in the treaty-
making process assumes a radical change in the Constitution, the
creation of machinery by which the Senate will voluntarily retire from
the field and permit all agreements with foreign Powers to be made by
the Executive or by the Executive with Congress, and the establish-
ment of a method by which the agreement can be submitted to Con-
gress for its examination and alteration, to be followed by Congressional
adoption, rejection or change, and formal Presidential ratification.
But since the President can, under the authors' suggested proposal,
disregard any change made by Congress and make his own agree-
37. The use of the President's power to make executive agreementn encroaching on the
Senate's treaty-making power was not by me "found justifiable" (MeDougal and Lans,
Treaties, at 246, note 133) but was explained or "justified" on the theory that the Sanate,
not having openly protested, had tacitly acquiesced.
38. 39 Ops. ATr'VY GEN. 484 (Aug. 27, 1940). See also my Editorial Comment in (1940)
34 An. J. INr. L. 690. Since Congress has to appropriate the funds for the naval ba as from
year to year, it may be questioned whether the agreement did not impose a future oliz'ation
on the legislature. The imposition of future obligations, requiring leglation by Congre.:.,
was the main reason why the oil agreement of 1944 became a treat'. ("An executive agr.c-
ment is ineffectual to confer upon Congress legislative powers that it dozz not otherwi:-2
possess." Fraser, Letter to Hon. Tom Connally, August 14, 1944. p. 2.) While the distinc-
tion between executive agreement and treaty is not clear, cspzclally when the President
expands the executive agreement beyond its constitutional proportions, there is a line
between them which enables practically all questions of distinction to be determined.
39. In a recent publication of the Department of State, TrmaTIEs SSUBTED TO THC
SENATE 1935-1944 (No. 2311, 1945) there is a list of treaties pending in the Senate (pp.
12-13); a list of the Treaty Series since No. 867 in 1932 (pp. 17-22; see alzo Tnawitrs SvE-
!MTTED TO TH SENATE 17S9-1934 (Dep't of State, Publication No. 765, 1935) 97-131, for
an earlier list), which gives a fair indication of the types of subject commonly submitted for
treaty approval; and (pp. 23-27) a series of draft conventions, recommendations and re_,olu-
tions of the ILO submitted (proposed?) in part for Congressional action and in part to the
Senate as treaties. Action on thee draft labor conventions semb never to have Le.n taken
by either house.
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ments,4 ° and since there seems to be an effort to portray his limited
powers to conclude independent executive agreements as in reality
unlimited,41 it is not apparent that he needs to submit any agreement
to Congress. At least, he alone is ostensibly the judge as to what he
will submit.4 2 Is this proposal supposed to impress Congress or the
Senate? The House-proposed constitutional amendment reflected a
realization of some of these difficulties with respect to treaties. But
whereas the House failed to adopt on May 9, 1945, the resolution of
the Committee making majorities sufficient for consent to treaties, the
authors propose to accomplish the same result without amendment.43
Can a more hopeless effort be envisaged? Needless to say, not a
single member of the House in the debate of May 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9, 1945,
supported the McClure theory, assiduously espoused by the authors.
Much more practical would it be, as happened with the recent oil and
aviation agreements and the Connally Resolution, for the Senate to use
its influence to bring to a halt the gradual encroachment of the Execu-
tive on its prerogatives and to restore an adherence to the limited func-
tions of the Executive in the making of independent executive agree-
ments.
To exhibit graphically what has happened in recent years, John
Bassett Moore has prepared the appended table which he has given
me permission to use. It shows the recent treaties and executive agree-
ments, tabulated according to year of publication: 4
40. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 209:
". .. in many situations the President possesses power under the Constitu-
tion to disregard the Senatorial or Congressional veto and consummate agreements
on [his] own responsibility."
See also id. at 317, 338, 346, to the effect that the President "might" disregard a statute
(which he had probably signed). He could also presumably disregard a treaty (ef. id. at
316). This seems an extraordinary theory of executive omnipotence.
41. See id. at 251. See also id. at 222-3, 310-1.
42. The authors maintain that he has the option of submitting his agreements to either
the House or Senate. They say (id. at 187):
"... our constitutional law today makes available two parallel and com-
pletely interchangeable procedures, wholly applicable to the same subject matters
and of identical domestic and international legal consequences, for the consumma-
tion of intergovernmental agreements."
It is curious that members of Congress and most professionals on the subject are unaware of
this. See the recent Congressional debate, cited supra note 4.
43. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 199 and passim.
While there would be no harm in making certain kinds of treaties, especially those
relating to commerce and finance, subject to approval by simple majorities in both houses of
Congress, the change cannot be effected without constitutional amendment.
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While some of the recent executive agreements can be explained
under the head of the war power, others, like the Wheat Agreement,
the Silver Agreement, the Aviation and Air Transport Agreements,
unemployment insurance benefits, the St. Lawrence Seaway project,
agricultural experimental stations, health and sanitation, finances of
foreign countries, to mention but a few, cannot be thus explained.
To use this evidence of encroachment as evidence of a growing "usage"
is to fail to distinguish the approved from the disapproved. It is like a
writer on intervention who, writing on the "law of intervention,"
assembled all the interventions he could find, and, on the assumption
that the law could be found in the practice of nations, induced the
law from the practice, whether good or bad. This is not the first time
that the violation of the limitations of law has been used to justify
the doctrine of nullification. Fortunately, unlike some aspects of
international law, the Constitution is a written document.
III
But what renders the gentlemen's thesis of the interchangeability of
the treaty and the executive agreement unsustainable, in spite of the
fact that McClure, Corwin, 45 and Quincy Wright 11 have lent their
names to the thesis, is the fact that the treaty and the executive agree-
ment exhibit fundamental differences, not explained away by such
45. CovwIN, THi CONSTITUTIONaMn XWORLD0RG. -z1x'xIO,1 (1944) pissiw.
46. Wright, The United States and International Agrcements (1944) 3S Ai.. J. Ir;m. L.
341. See also Levitan, Constitutional Derelopnents in tlze Control of Foreign Affairs: A Quest
for Democratic Control (1945) 7 J. POLITICS 53.
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consoling expressions as "all but," "not very dissimilar," "most,"
"reasonably durable," 41 or by such vague words as "functional,"
"instrumental," etc., etc. No light is thrown on the question by the
statement of the authors that all forms of international engagement,
whatever the name given them, are in effect "treaties," 4S but the
gentlemen imply, strangely, that they may all therefore be considered
as executive agreements, constitutionally. "Treaties," in the constitu-
tional and legal sense, have acquired a special significance, possessed
by no other type of international document, because the Constitution
mentions them alone and gives them a special constitutional protection.
The "compact clause" 41 shows that the Founders were not unaware
of the distinction between treaties and lesser instruments.
The differences between treaties and executive agreements can best
be shown by presenting an outline in parallel columns and then elab-
orating the outline in succeeding paragraphs. Both types of executive
agreement are covered, those made pursuant to an act of Congress,
about which there is little difficulty, and those not so made. They
are not, however, confused. The outline follows:
TREATIES
1. A treaty, as is evident from Mis-
souri v. Holland, is like a constitu-
tional amendment. It can deal
with any subject appr6priate to
international negotiation.
2. A treaty can do what Congress
cannot. It confers legislative
power on Congress (Missouri v.
Holland).
3. A treaty must be ratified to be
binding, according to American
practice.
4. A treaty, as its name indicates,
binds the United States for its
duration. It cannot be repealed
by act of Congress except for do-
mestic purposes only. The inter-
47. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 307-8.
48. .Id. at 195-6.
49. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 10.
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
An executive agreement is strictly
limited. It can deal only with
subjects especially delegated by
Congress or, if made independ-
ently by the President, can deal
only with normal powers vested
in tie Commander-in-Chief and
principal diplomatic officer.
An executive agreement cannot
do what Congress cannot. It can-
not confer on Congress powers of
legislation it did not have before.
An executive agreement need not
be ratified by the United States.
An executive agreement, as its
name indicates, "binds" only as
long as it suits both sides. It
morally "binds" only the signing
Executive, not his successors. If
[Vol. 54 :616
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national obligation remains bind-
ing.
5. A treaty has a special significance
in constitutional law. It can re-
peal an act of Congress.
6. A treaty, by the Constitution, is
the "supreme law of the land."
7. Only a new treaty can alter or
modify an earlier treaty.
8. A treaty is submitted to the Sen-
ate for formal consideration and
consent, rejection, amendment or
reservations.
9. A treaty lasts, with unimportant
exceptions, as long as its terms
provide.
10. No secret treaty can be made by
the United States. Treaties-must
be published.
they wish it to continue, it is by
voluntary act. An executive
agreement is subject to repeal by
act of Congress domestically and
internationally. Unilateral indi-
cation of desire to terminate
suffices. Repeal of authorizing
statute suffices.
An executive agreement is un-
mentioned in the Constitution
and has grown only through the
necessity of maling ageements
of a character not to warrant sub-
mission to the Senate. It can be
repealed by Congress at any time,
but cannot repeal an act of Con-
gress. It can of course be nullified
or abrogated by treaty, prior or
subsequent.
An executive agreement, with a
few exceptions as to contrary
state law or when made pursuant
to act of Congress, is not supreme
law of the land.
An executive agreement cannot
alter or modify a treaty.
An executive agreement is not
"submitted" to Congress for con-
sideration or for approval, rejec-
tion, amendment or reservations.
There is no procedure for subse-
quent approval, sanction or rati-
fication by Congress.
An executive agreement is ter-
minable at any time at the un-
ilateral vish of one of the parties.
This is true even if it purports to
run for a given number of years.
No successor to the Preident is
bound by the latter's agreement,
although he may consent to per-
mit it to stand.
An executive agreement invites
secrecy since the President can
make it vithout notifying any-
body. Several secret agreements
are now known.
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Now to elaborate on these points:
1. Scope. A treaty, under the doctrine of Missouri v. Holland 1o and
Geofroy v. Riggs,5' may deal with any matters properly the subject of
negotiation with a foreign Power. It is not therefore limited to the
subjects placed by Article I of the Constitution within the limited
legislative powers of Congress or to the subjects on which Congress
has legislated in practice. The Constitution is based on the theory
that this is a government of limited powers, in spite of the "necessary
and proper" clause, so that the Tenth Amendment has been deemed
merely a "truism," nonessential surplusage. 52 But a treaty, that was
once thought to be limited also by the Constitution, 3 can, as is most
clearly apparent from Missouri v. Holland, give the Federal Govern-
ment and Congress new power they never had before. 4 We have al-
ready observed that future legislative obligations require a treaty."
The subject matter of executive agreements is strictly limited, 0
even by "usage," to specific powers, under or outside Congressional
authorization. Nor can the limited powers of either Congress or the
Executive, added together, constitute the plenary power cohtended
for.5 7 Nor is any method suggested by which the two may be joined.
50. 252 U. S. 416 (1920). See also Boyd, The Expanding Treaty Power (1928) 6 N. C. L;
Rv. 428, 444.
51. 133 U. S. 258 (1890).
52. United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941).
53. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258 (1890).
54. See infra, p. 632.
55. Supra, p. 625.
56. McDougal and Lans state that the power of the President is limited. See Treaties,
at, e.g., 211 (note 1), 311, 317. Says Dodd in International Relations and the Treaty Power
(1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 360, 361: ". . . his complete power relates only to a limited group of
transactions. . . ." Says Sayre, The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act (1939)
39 COL. L. Rnv. 751, 755: "He must act scrupulously within the laws and conform to the
policies already established by the Congress." That the executive agreement could grant no
legislative powers was the point of Mr. Fraser's opinion, acted upon, as to why the oil agree-
ment had to be a treaty. The same reason, including the imposition of future obligations,
invalidated the St. Lawrence agreement.
57. In an earlier part of this reply (supra, p. 620), reference was made to the authors'
allegation that the President's limited power plus Congress's limited power made the power
of Congressional-Executive agreements plenary. If Congress has more power than the
limited powers granted in Article I, Section 8, they must get it from the President. If his
power is unlimited in the field of foreign affairs, suggested at least on certain pages (Mc.
Dougal and Lans, Treaties, at 250-2, 260; "under the separation of powers doctrine, Con-
gressional action might not affect either the domestic effect of the agreement or its status as
an international contract." Id. at 338; see also id. at 317, 346), he can presumably abrogate
or disregard statutes and treaties (see id. at 316), and now by hypothesis can endow Con-
gress with the power to implement his agreement by a Congressional act, making a Con-
gressional-Executive agreement-which possibly he may immediately disregard. This
theory proves too much. United States v. Pink was, it is believed, wrongly decided. Levitan,
Constitutional Developments in the Control of Foreign Affairs: A Quest for Democratic Control
(1945) 7 J. POLITICS 58, 83, characterizes the Belmont and Pink decisions as not "good" law.
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Even if, argvuendo, it were admitted that Congress has all the necessary
powers to deal with foreign relations, including the power to authorize
all executive agreements, the fact is that they have exercised power
only in specific types of cases, whereas the treaty-making power has
habitually been used to deal with such subjects as naturalization,
establishment, extradition, consular privileges, peace and friendship,
restoration of peace, alien ownership of realty, claims against the
United States, guaranty of independence and neutrality, multilateral
treaties, double taxation, exercise of fishing rights, and other mat-
ters.5 1
But it was never thought that these cases would be used to make the argument that this
country is already by law a potential one-man dictatorship.
John Bassett Moore has said of the suggestion that the Executive has unlimited power
to make treaties:
". .. In the second place, I deem it to be inconceivable that there should exist
in the United States any general sentiment in favor of committing to the Executive
Department of the Government the entire and absolute control of the function
of treaty-making.
"It is not going too far to say that the existence in the United States of a wide-
spread sentiment in favor of committing exclusively to the Executive the power to
make treaties would justify a feeling of profound apprehension and alarm."
5 COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN BASSETr MOORE (1944) 95. Alexander Hamilton added
that "it would be utterly unsafe and improper to intrust that [treaty-malingi power to an
elective magistrate of four years' duration." THE FEDEnALIST (Lodge, ed., 1891) 467,
quoted in MooRE, supra, at 95.
Congress's power is limited by Article 1, not because of the Tenth Amendment, but
because the powers granted withheld those not granted. Congr(ss unless fortified by
underlying treaties never has validly exercised other power.
McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 317, 338, 346, and others, state that the power of
Congress may be limited. See also id. at 187 (Congressional-Executive agreement inter-
changeable with the treaty "for all practical purposes"), 255 ("most, if not all, of the im-
portant problems of peace and war"), 314 ("within the scope of its powers"). Occacionally
(id. at 211, 222-3, 238, 241, 259, 310) the authors suggest that Congress has all the balance
of power in foreign affairs not possessed by the President. Yet several recent agreement-,
covering the St. Lawrence project, oil, peace, possibly aviation, could not be cast in the
form of statute or executive agreement! Says Dodd, International Relations and tMe Treaty
Power (1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 360, 361: "If action is within the power of Congrezo, the same
result may be obtained by the two houses, subject to the approval of the President, as by the
President with the concurrence of 'two-thirds of the senators present.'" It has never becn
doubted that there is a limited area in which the powers of Congress and Senate may be
deemed to overlap and Congress may "authorize" action or the treaty method may be used.
That was the Texas (1845) and Hawaii (IS98) annexation. But the power of Congres3 to
"authorize" is limited and not plenary, and that would seem to defeat the thesis of inter-
changeability of executive agreement and treaty. For a discussion of the relation between
Congress and the treaty-making power see W1Vright, Treaties and the Constitutioral Separatiar
of Powers in the United States (1918) 12 Aw. J. INT. L. 64.
Does Congress get more power because the President agrees first and they are suppo_-ed
to approve, Sanction or implement? If so, they get power not from the Constitution but
from the President. We know fairly well the limits of the President's indepmdent power,
which includes the recognition of foreign govern ments.
58. See the list of subjects commonly cast in treaty form in the speech of Mr. Merrow,
91 Cong. Rec., May 7, 1945, at 4320.
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The idea that Congress could "authorize" the President to make a
treaty is violative of the treaty-making power. Congress can hardly
"authorize" what it cannot directly ratify. Whether tvo-thirds of the
Senate could "authorize" a treaty, thus giving their "advice and con-
sent" in advance,59 we need not consider. That is not the customary
way treaties are concluded. In any event, there is no way to escape the
treaty-making power in matters which are properly the subj'ect of
treaties. To suggest that the President has the option of submitting
an agreement in the form of a treaty or an agreement to be approved by
Congress 6-the authors' proposed Congressional-Executive agree-
ment-is an assertion that when two-thirds of the Senate cannot be
obtained a majority of House and Senate will satisfy the purpose.
There is no constitutional warrant for this assumption."' If the House
and Senate cannot by bare majority ratify a treaty, the House and
Senate cannot authorize the President to depart from the Constitution
by disregarding the two-thirds Senate rule. Any House or Senate agree-
ment to evade the constitutional provision may serve to forfeit the
Senate's privileges, if practiced often enough. But it leaves the consti-
tutional provision unimpaired. Neither by subsequent act nor by ac-
tion in advance can House and Senate by majorities legally authorize a
circumvention of the Constitution.
2. Legislative Power. That a treaty can do what Congress by statute
cannot do is illustrated by Missouri v. Holland.12 The first Migratory
Bird Act of 1913 was held unconstitutional, as not within the power of
Congress, by one state and two federal courtnA' The federal cases
59. Lodge, The Treaty-Making Powers of the Senate (1902) 31 SCRIBNER'S 33, 42; Black,
The United States Senate and the Treaty Power (1931) 4 Rocxy MT. L. REV. 1, 5, 11. There
is also an opinion that reservations and amendments constitute Senate "advice" before
consent is final. See Senator Overton in Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Commerce on S. 1385, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) 201.
60. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 187,324.
61. The proposed amendment was not passed by the House, "with House leaders ad-
mitting that the fate of the Resolution was highly uncertain." N. Y. Times, May 10, 1945,
p. 24, col. 2. But a substitute, providing that a majority of the House and Senate enrollment
must approve, was passed May 9, 1945, by a vote of 288 to 88, 56 not voting. 91 Cong. Rec.,
May 9, 1945, at 4440-1. It has little support in the Senate. Yet an amendment of the
Constitution is the only lawful way of accomplishing the result.
62. 252 U. S. 416 (1920). Cf. Article V of the treaty with Switzerland, 1850, 2 MALLOY,
TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMRNTS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AmERICA AND OTHER POWERS (1923) 1765, permitting Swiss citizens
to inherit real estate in the United States; treaties permitting consuls to administer estates
of their nationals; Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U. S. 317 (1912); Article II of the treaty with
Germany, U. S. TREATY SER. No. 725 (1923), permitting Germans to recover for personal
injuries regardless of alienage; Hyde, Constitutional Procedures for International Agreement
by the United States (1937) 31 PRoc. Am. Soc. INT. L. 45,53.
63. United States v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154 (E. D. Ark. 1914); United States v. Mc-




were brought on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Chief
Justice WTite was very anxious to sustain the statute as essential to
the operations of government, for he observed, as did Justice Holmes
in Missouri v. Holland, that the states were quite unreliable in safe-
guarding this great natural resource, so necessary to agriculture. But
the court stood divided 3 to 3, three judges being ill or absent. The
Chief Justice thereupon held the cases undecided upon until a full bench
could sit, but in the meantime engaged the writer, then Librarian of
the Supreme Court, to make an exhaustive study of the law., from
Roman times until the present to endeavor to show that the Federal
Government must possess the power of bird regulation. The study,
which occupied several months, reached the conclusion that the states
alone were the repositories of the power to regulate migratory birds,
since by no possibility could this migratory resource be called interstate
commerce, which depends on the acts of man. In the conversations
with the Chief Justice and Dr. Holmes of the Bureau of Animal Indus-
try, there developed an idea, earlier suggested in a resolution intro-
duced by Senator McLean of Connecticut, that a treaty with Canada
might be concluded, whereupon the legislation could be enacted again
and rest for its constitutional justification upon the implementation
of a treaty.
Thereupon, on August 16, 1916, a treaty with Canada was con-
cluded and approved by the Senate in record time."4 Because of the
impending war, and for other reasons, delays occurred in the enact-
ment of an implementing statute, so that it was not until early 1918
that the second Migratory Bird Act was passed. A federal game
warden was then enjoined by the State of Missouri from enforcing the
Act, and its constitutionality subjected to judicial test. As is well
known, Justice Holmes sustained the Act as an execution of the treaty,
and thus proved to the satisfaction of the public that a treaty not only
can add to federal legislative power but can do what an act of Congress
cannot. It gave rise to the inference that not only natural resources,
like fish in boundary waters,, perhaps oil and other substances now
controlled by the states, but social legislation, like labor regulation C1
and marriage and divorce, could by the exercise of the treaty power
be brought under federal control by means of an underlying treaty.,
Indeed, .Missouri v. Holland led to such expansive conceptions of
64. 39 STAT. 1702.
65. See 22 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 214-8 (Griggs, 1898).
66. See Boyd, The .Epa ding Trealy Pvcer (1928) 6 N. C. L. Rnv. 430,449.
67. Treaties have frequently been entered into removing from ccrtain aliens the di:-
abilities of alienage in the ovmership or the heritability of real estate, providing for ,erl:-
men's compensation for personal injuries, and governing consular administration of estatez,
which of course no act of Congress could consider. Only federal reluctance to encro2ch upon
state matters prevents a vider use of such treaties. See also Neely v. Henlel, 180 U. S. 109
(1901).
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federal power that writers anxious for states' rights protested such a
.development. Little has been done to give substance to the fear,
but, if it is entertained when limited by the two-thirds rule, how much
greater and more justified would be the fear if the plan for federal
regulation could be realized by mere majority vote in both houses.
This will be the subject of later discussion.
Not long ago, on August 24, 1944, the President submitted to the
Senate as a treaty the oil agreement of August 8, 1944, with Great
Britain. The background discloses that it had first been intended to
conclude the plan by executive agreement. Senators Connally and
Maloney heard of the plan and became apprehensive at the proposed
submersion of the Senate's prerogative, if the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee should decide that the subject ought to be dealt with by treaty.
The Chairman, Mr. Connally, thereupon asked a distinguished lawyer,
Mr. Henry S. Fraser, General Counsel of the Special Committee In-
vestigating Petroleum Resources, to make a study of the subject of
treaties and executive agreements for the Committee's information. On
the basis of historical studies, Mr. Fraser came to the conclusion that
there were certain subjects involving future legislation, including oil
production and distribution, which could not be dealt with by execu-
tive agreement but required a treaty.69
Thereupon, the President was notified and the agreement was duly
submitted to the Senate. Senator Connally, after examining the
treaty, expressed the opinion that it would never receive the approval
of the Senate. The industry learned of the treaty. They expressed the
belief that the agreement undertook to centralize the administration
of the oil industry in a Petroleum Commission and in the Federal
Government-which, however, was not obliged to accept the recom-
mendations of the Commission. By legislation, that government could
practically control all production, proration and marketing of oil-
invalid in the absence of a treaty. In addition, no immunity from
prosecution under the anti-trust laws for following the orders or recom-
mendations of the International Petroleum Commission, when ap-
proved by the United States, was assured.
On January 10, 1945, the agreement was withdrawn by the President
for renegotiation with Great Britain. 0 A revised draft treaty was
proposed by the Committee. A closed hearing of the Petroleum War
Council of the industry was later held and certain fundamental changes
68. See Thompson, State Sovereignty and the Treaty-Making Power (1922) 11 CALir. L.
REv. 242,247, 250.
69. See Fraser, Treaties and Executive Agreements, SEN. Doc. No. 244, 78th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1944). See also letter of Fraser to Senator Connally, Aug. 14, 1944.
70. See (1945) 11 DEP'T. oF STATE BULL. No. 290, p. 63: "It appears to the Department
that the misunderstandings which have arisen come not from lack of agreement upon these
objectives but from the implementing features attending them."
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suggested. When the Government has made up its mind on the im-
munity clause, and after the two governments have come to an agree-
ment on the other suggested changes, it is presumed that the treaty
will be resubmitted to the Senate. Even though the final treat, does
not include an immunity clause, it is hoped by the industry that legis-
lation will take care of the issue. The incident illustrates the danger
of the executive agreement, in attempting to commit an industry with-
out its knowledge and to change the constitutional distribution of
powers between state and federal governments.
Needless to say, iio executive agreement could perform the extra-
constitutional function of conferring new legislative power on Con-
gress.7' If it is alleged that it could, excessive power would be vested
in one man. If, like a treaty, it could set aside earlier acts of Congress
or even prior treaties, we would have the anomalous position that the
chief executive could by virtue of an executive agreement govern this
country without the assistance of Congress. And if it should be as-
serted that he could only govern with the approval of a majority in
Congress, the question naturally arises what machinery for such ap-
proval is provided, whether such a practice has ever been adopted, and
how it can be supposed that the Senate would, by a majority, vote
for such an unconstitutional abdication of its treaty-making power.
Possibly the nearest approach to the effectuation of any such plan
is in the UNRRA agreement,72 hardly mentioned by the authors.
After the executive agreement was signed, the Department of State
called upon a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate, consisting of Messrs. Vandenberg, Connally, Green and
Thomas (Utah), to study the project and offer suggestions for change.
The Committee requested some twventy-seven changes in the agree-
ment, whereupon these were submitted to the other governments and
agreed to. Since the agreement looked to a contribution of $1,350,000,-
000 from the United States Congress, it was of some importance. When
the changes were approved the agreement was included in a joint
resolution of Congress and reintroduced as a bill. An assurance was
given to the Senate by Senators Connally and Vandenberg that the
agreement bound the Congress to nothing, and the Senate was urged
not to insist upon its treaty powers. It would seem that the bill was at
least an authorization, with the promise of future appropriations. At
all events, the Congress made numerous amendments and "reserva-
71. Congress on a few occasions has decided to accept the agreement's advantages, in-
directly, by making an appropriation, as in the case of Horsezhoe Reef and the naval ba=e.
See infra, p. 655.
72. U. S. ExEc. AGREFI'T SER. No. 352 (1943). See Briggs, The LA'RR,4 Agrcme.cn
and Congress (1944) 38 Am.. J. Ier. L. 650. Mr. Sayre testified, in Hcarings tfre tAe Con.
mitee on Foreign Affairs on H. J. Res. 192, 78th Cong., 1st and 2d Se2T. (1943-1944) 153:
"... the draft agreement was not intended to impose binding obligations...."
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tions" in the bill, whereupon it passed both houses.7 3 Professor Briggs
maintains that the UNRRA was conclusively established by the execu-
tive agreement of November 9, 1943, and that the Resolution of Con-
gress was misleadingly but actually an implementation of the agree-
ment. He says that such a proceeding, approving adherence to an
organization without contracting pecuniary obligations, is not likely
-to occur again and that it is sui generis.
3. Ratification. A treaty must be ratified to be binding,7 4 but only
rarely has an executive agreement been ratified by the United States.5
Usually, as in Executive Agreement Series Numbers 209 and 223,
it is an indication that it has been submitted to the Senate as a treaty.70
Speaking of the Wadsworth (Paris) agreement of May 25, 1923,
Secretary Hughes informed the American charg6:
"Inasmuch as the agreement is not a treaty but is rather an ex-
ecutive agreement for the discharge of a claim due to the Govern-
ment of the United States, it is deemed by this Government that
ratification by and with the advice and consent of the Senate is not
necessary but that the formal approval of the agreement by the
President will suffice." 77
73. Pub. L. No. 267, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 28, 1944). See also report on the bill
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, SEN. REP. No. 668 (1944).
74. Says Quincy Wright, in Treaties and the Constitutional Separation of Powers in Mhe
United States (1918) 12 AM. J. INT. L. 64, 93: ". . . the treaty, if ratified, would be valid,
and all other departments of government . . .are bound by their allegiance to the Con-
stitution to perform the acts necessary to give it effect."
In U. S. ExEc. AGREEM'T SER. No. 249 (1942) 1, with Canada, dealing with military
service of Canadians and Americans in the two countries, as in other executive agreements
on the same subject, the Department of State in a note said: "It will be recalled that during
the World War this Government signed conventions with certain associated powers on this
subject. The United States Government believes, however, that under existing circum-
stances the same ends may now be accomplished through administrative action, thus ob-
viating the delays incident to the signing and ratification of conventions," (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
75. It was done, exceptionally, in the matter of the lease from Cuba of the Guantanamo
Naval Station, 1 MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS
AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS (1910)
360. The authors in this respect, as in others, underestimate the difference between execu-
tive agreements and treaties. See MeDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 320.
76. These were temporary diversions of water above Niagara Falls, supplementary
to the treaty of 1909. On that account, they were submitted to and approved by the Senate,
The arrangement was effected by exchange of notes.
77. Quoted in 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1943) 400. See also 2
PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1923 (Dep't of
State, 1938) (hereinafter cited as FOREIGN RELATIONS. [YEAR] ) 186, n. 26. See also the
following paragraphs from the memorandum of the Solicitor, July 28, 1923, printed in 5
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1943) 400-1:
"The Constitution while conditioning the making of treaties upon the advice
and consent of the Senate (Article 2, Section 2, Paragraph 2) contains not a word
on the subject of ratification. As there is no reference to such action in respect to
[Vol. 54: 616
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS-A REPLY
Occasionally, foreign governments may reserve the privilege of sub-
jecting an executive agreement to ratification of their ovn govern-
ment,7s but this is not the American practice.
The authors say, "Generally speaking, diplomatic practice requires a
formal act of ratification before an international arrangement will be
regarded as binding. . .. ,, 71 Crandall, cited as authority, merely
speaks of treaties as requiring ratification. Executive agreements are
not ratified and require no ratification. Equally strange is the state-
ment s0 that the decision as to whether or not to ratify an approved
agreement or treaty is wholly executive. The gentlemen fail to dis-
tinguish the two instruments, whereas in the matter of ratification, as
in other respects, they are different.Sl
4. Repealability. A treaty, as its name indicates and the Constitu-
tion provides, is binding on the United States. Even though John Jay
thought it reprehensible that an act of Congress should be deemed
capable, even domestically, of departing from the terms of a treat,, 2
nevertheless it is now generally conceded -3 that a treaty may be re-
agreements of any character, it cannot reasonably be inferred that if the Pre-ident
instructs a Plenipotentiary to insert a provision for ratification in an agreement, he
thereby imposes upon himself a duty to ratify solely under the conditions which
would constitutionally arise if the agreement were a treaty. . ..
"In a word, it may be gravely doubted whether the Paris agreement of May25,
1923, compels a contracting party to ratify, if in its judgment the agreement is of a
character such that ratification is not demanded by the constitutional require-
ments of its own country . . ."
That the ratification by the United States of an easecutive agreement is not nece-ary
and is resisted, even when the foreign government suggests it, see note from Secretary Root
to Germany, 1907, printed in 5 -kc woRTH, DIGEST OF INTErm,,TIO,.*AL LAW (1943) 416.
"Postal conventions" are sometimes ratified by a foreign government. because its law co
requires, but not by the United States. Said the Department of State in 1903: "Such postal
treaties or conventions are not submitted to the Senate and are not therdore formally
ratified by and with the advice and consent of the Senate as in the case of other treatir' ..
5 HAcEwORTH, DIGEST OF INrERNATIONAL LAW (1943) 412.
78. See Art. MX of UNR1-A agreement, U. S. ExMe. AGREE'T Sn. No. 352 (1943) 7;
Briggs, The UN"RRA Agreement and Congress (1944)33 An. J. t L. 650,653, n. 8.
79. McDouigal and Lans, Treaties, at 209. Cf. id. at 202 (note 27), 320.
So. Id. at 209.
81. Seesupra, p. 632.
82. ". . . treaties are made, not by only one of the contracting partiez, but by both;
and consequently, . . . as the consent of both vas essential to their formation at first, so
must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The proposed Constitution, therdore,
has not in the least extended the obligation of treaties. They are just as binding, and just
as far beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts now, as they will be at any future p2riol, or
under any form of government." THE FEDERALIST (Lodge, d., 1891) No. 6, p 405. Sce
also Boyd, The Expanding Treaty Power (1928) 6 N. C. L. REv. 428.430.
83. Since Marshall's decision in Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (U. S. 1829). This rule
is said by several students of the subject to rest on the mistake made in Taylor v. Morton,
23 Fed. Cas. 784. No. 13,799 (C. C. D. lass. 1855). See Potter, Relatire Atilhorify of Inter-
nationai Law and National Law uin the United States (1925) 19 ,Az. J. It;T. L. 315, 316.
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pealed for domestic purposes by an act of Congress. But the treaty still
remains a binding international obligation of the United States. Its
"repeal" merely means that one societal agent, the courts, are bound
by the last expression of the legislative will; but the societal agent who
represents the United States in foreign relations, the Executive, must
give satisfaction to the foreign nation in the form of an indemnity or
other amends. The treaty binds the United States until it expires.8 4
Says Garner:
"Unless otherwise provided in the treaty itself, a State cannot
justify its failure to perform its obligations under a treaty because
of any provisions or omissions in its municipal law, or because of
any special features of its governmental organization or its constitu-
tional system." 85
Said Secretary Hughes in 1922:
"It is necessary to point out the distinction between domestic
law and international obligation. It is, of course, true that a Nation
may by its Constitution and laws override treaties, but by 'such
domestic acts, however sanctioned nationally, it cannot escape its
international duties and obligations." 86
84. 1 repudiate any such suggestion as the one that treaties can be departed from at
will (McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 339). On the contrary, in principle pacta sunt senanda.
See Kunz, The Meaning and the Range of the Norm Pacta Sunt Servanda (1945) 39 Am. J.
INT. L. 180. The authors have no authority to suggest my "inarticulate premise" or to
attribute to me the view that I regard treaties as "permanent." (McDougal and Lans,
Treaties, at 333.) Treaties last as long as they provide for. It is exceedingly ambiguous if
not wrong to speak of "the power [of Congress] to abrogate treaties by joint resolution of
both houses." (Id. at 241.)
85. RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, LAW OF TREATIES (1935) (published as 29
Au. J. INT. L. Sure., No. 4) art. 23, p. 1029. See Comment, id. at 1030 el seg. At page 1034
Garner said: "See, in this connection, the following statement of the United States Secre-
tary of State made with reference to the Cutting Case:
'... if a government could set up its own municipal laws as the final test of its
international rights and obligations, then the rules of international law would be
but the shadow of a name and would afford no protection either ta States or to in-
dividuals. It has been constantly maintained and also admitted by the Govern-
ment of the United States that a government cannot appeal to its municipal regula-
tions as an answer to demands for the fulfillment of international duties. Such
regulations may either exceed or fall short of the requirements of international law
and in either case that law furnishes the test of the nation's liability and not its own
municipal rules. . . . (U. S. Foreign Relations, 1887, p. 751; 2 Moore, Digest of
InternationalLaw, 1906, p. 235 .)''
Says Hyde: "It must be clear that while an American court may deem itself obliged to
sustain an Act of Congress, however inconsistent with the terms of an existing treaty, its
action in so doing serves to lessen in no degree the contractual obligation of the United
States with respect to the other party or parties to the agreement." 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL
LAw (2d rev. ed. 1945) 1465. See also RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, at 1036.
86. 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1922 at 646; 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d rev, ed.




Not so with an executive agreement. As its name indicates, it is
made not in the manner alone knonm to the Constitution as a method of
binding the United States; it is an act only of the ExecutiveY7 When
it is spoken of as "binding" on anybody, the word is ambiguous or a
misnomerss If a rule is binding only so long as it suits both parties, it
is not "binding" at all. s9
An illuminating correspondence on this question took place in 1894
with Brazil. Congress had just repealed the Tariff Act of 1890 under
which tariff agreements for reduced duty were made with several
countries, among others, Brazil. On being notified that the agreement
had come to an end by the repeal of the "authorizing" statute, Brazil
claimed that it should run until January 1895. Insisting, however,
that the agreement had terminated instantaneously upon the repeal
of the underlying statute, Secretary Gresham made the legal position
abundantly clear." Secretary Gresham's view is not to be explained,
87. The "many writers" who have "suggested that [executive] agreements, in assumed
contrast to treaties, constitute only moral obligations or are not 'binding' "are raid to do so
"loosely" because they overlook "their functional operation at domestic or international
law." McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 307. In my original article in 53 Y.AL L. J. 664,
some of these writers were cited and quoted. The supporting reasons for this conclu-Ion
have been presented supra, pp. 617-23.
88. There really is no such thing as a "binding executive agreement" (M[cDougal and
Lans, Treaties, at 321) binding on the United States. The United States can always with-
draw. The phrase "binding effect of the executive agreement under domestic law" (id. at
308) is ambiguous. It could mean only that so long as it is allowed to remain in force, if
otherwise valid, it is law-if it is-controlling the states.
89. See Borchard, Political Theory and Internatimial Law in Dut.;Pc, A -Hsronx' or
POLrICAL THxoajEs, REcEsr TImES (1924) 120, 130 n., citing Sir Henry .Maine and Charles
Merriam.
Vattel (see McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 227) constituted a bridge between the
school of natural law of the eighteenth century and the positive jurists of the nineteenth
century. He shows the influence of both schools and is therefore properly characterized as
belonging to both. See 1 OePEnnEri, INTERNA.-,TiONAL L.w (5th ed. 1935) 92.
90. He wrote: ". . . it can not be supposed that it was intended, by the simple ex-
change of notes on January 31, 1891, to bind our Governments as by a treaty... beyond
the time when the Congress of the United States might ... repeal the legislation under
which the arrangement was concluded." FoREIGN RELATIONS: 1894 at 8I.
In addition, Gresham said:
"I think it clear that the reciprocity arrangement between Brazil and the
United States was terminated by the going into force of our existing tariff law, and
I do not think the Fxecutive Departments can act upon any other theory...
"The so-called treaties or agreements that were entered into based upon the
third section of the McKinley bill were not treaties binding upon the twvo Govern-
ments, and the present law is mandatory. Notice to your Government that the
arrangement would terminate as provided by its terms would have no force, as the
arrangement actually exists no longer." Id. at 77.
"The Constitution of the United States, like the constitution of Brazil, points
out the way in which treaties may be made and the faith of the nation duly pledged.
. . . Of such provisions in each other's constitutions governments are assumed to
take notice. 'The municipal constitution of every particular state,' cays Wheaton,
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as the authors undertake to do,9 by the fact that Brazil was charged
with knowledge of the vulnerability of the executive agreement or
that the Act of 1890 was a special act. All acts of Congress have a
special character. The statute was like all similar acts conferring
power 9n the Executive to make agreements in execution of the act.
As the Department of State said in its answer to Mr. Simpson in
1934,
"Executive agreements . . . entered into under one President
continue to remain in force under his successors unless and un-
til . . .notice of a desire to terminate is given by one side or the
other." 92
That is, one side can at any time withdraw,93 which is not true of a
treaty; and it is believed that this is true in law whether the executive
agreement allegedly runs for a given time or provides for a notice of
'determines in whom resides the authority to ratify treaties negotiated and con-
cluded with foreign powers, so as to render them obligatory upon the nation;'
(Elements of International Law, Dana's ed., pp. 33 7, 338)." Id. at 81.
The same position was taken by the Department of State in connection with the abroga-
tion of the executive agreement with France made under the Tariff Act of 1897. It "would
[said the Department], in the absence of enabling legislation by Congress, have been termi-
nated ipso facto on the going into force of the tariff act of the United States approved
August 5, 1909, which has changed the bases on which these agreements were negotiated."
Congress had, by Section 4 of the new act, considerately allowed the executive agreement
to remain, in force for six months after repeal of the old act. Said the Department: The
"President" is "obliged to follow implicitly the prescriptions of the new tariff act." 5 HAc-
WORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1943) 429.
91. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 349.
92. Quoted in Simpson, Legal Aspects of Executive Agreements (1938) 24 IoWA L. Rrv.
67,86.
93. Notice of the termination of an executive agreement does not involve its being
"rescinded by negotiation" (McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 346). No negotiation is
necessary, as the authors seem to believe; it is automatically terminated. If Congress can
terminate at pleasure and will an executive agreement concluded under "authority of Con-
gress" (see WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922) 236; Todd,
The President's Power to Make International Agreements (1927) 11 CONST'L Rrv. 160, 167),
Congress could presumably also repeal its ex post facto approval. But this conflicts with
the law governing treaties and would indicate another difference from the executive agree-
ment. Foreign countries might resent this precariousness of American agreements.
The authors' view (McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 346, note 173) that a new Presi-
dent has power to terminate or abrogate a treaty, like an executive agreement, at any time,
involves a serious misapprehension. Apart from the admission that a new President may
terminate an executive agreement, it is not true that a new President has iower, or any
right, to terminate a treaty, if it is still in force. It can only be terminated as its terms pro-
vide. It binds the nation and the President. Otherwise, a treaty would have force only as, it
suits both parties, like an executive agreement. It would be a voluntary "obligation." The
President has, I think, not even power to nullify a treaty, which is all that a purported
Presidential termination prior to expiration would usually amount to.
The statement is made (id. at 346) that "Congressional-Executive agreements remain
in force unless the act of Congress ...by which they were ratified is repealed." There is
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termination. The successor cannot be bound by the executive agree-
ments of his predecessor. 4 WNrhile it is perhaps a moral obligation of the
signing President to observe the executive agreement during his ad-
ministration, no such obligation, moral or legal, rests upon his succes-
sor. If the successor or successors perchance continue to observe its
terms, it is because they choose to leave it unaltered, and not because
they cannot cancel the obligation at will.
One significant difference between the two instruments lies in the
power of Congress to repeal an executive agreement, whether made in
pursuance of an act of Congress or independently thereof.3 We have
no provision for ratification by act of Congress. The statement reprezcents a theory only,
not a practice.
The authors assume that the President has an option to mahe his instrument of agree-
ment with a foreign country a treaty or an executive agreement to be ratified "by the Senate
or by Congress." It is submitted that there is no such alternative, and that the fuggeZtion
involves a change in this form of government. The treaty clause was well considered and is
not a thoughtless compromise (see note 157 infra).
If the control of foreign relations cannot be shared by 97 men (id. at 553), how can it be
shared by 97 plus 435?
94. Todd, The President's Power to Make Intenzational Agrcm.ents (1927) 11 Co!.sr'L
REv. 160, 162, 164, citing Secretary Hughes, seems to doubt whether a Precident can bind
his successor. Todd speaks of "agreements" not amounting to treaties. Id. at 103.
95. The authors say (McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 33S): "Clearly any Precident
has power to terminate the internal status of such agreements as the law of the land." How
can this be done if it binds the nation? Either the authors agree with my thezis that the
executive agreement is not binding on the nation, or Congress alone may terminate. If the
President has the power to terminate he must also have the power to terminate the external
status. If this is so, the authors thereby admit the vulnerability of the executive agreement
made under the President's independent power.
He cannot do that with a treaty. If so, why has this not been done, except under
legislative direction or acquiescence, and never contra?
The executive agreement also may be terminated, the authors admit, "indirectly, by
the enactment of conflicting or inconsistent legislation." Id. at 336; applied to executive
agreements, id. at 337-3; see also id. at 199 (agreements "made pursuant to the PrecidCnt'a
authority alone, when within the scope of his independent powers, have . . . cubstantially
the same status as treaties . . . except in some cases where there is contradictory lgdi-la-
tion"), 343 (". . . -hen it becomes necesmary or appropriate because of the cnactrnent of
contrary legislation to terminate an executive agreement . . .". and, ". . . an executive
agreement (like a treaty) is superseded domestically as a general rule, by enactment of con-
trary legislation . . .). Not so if a treaty. "But where [agreements negotiated by the
President] are predicated upon the President's independent constitutional powers, cuch a
in the field of foreign relations, under the separation of powers doctrine, Congre':ional action
might not affect either the domestic effect of the agreement or its status as an international
contract." Id. at 33S. This would appear to qualify what has just Lbeen admitted. But it
cannot be qualified.
If the President has entire control of the executive agreement and can make it alterna-
tively with a treaty, why does he need any authority from Congrczs, as in the case of the
tariff treaties and Field v. Clark? By hypothesis he had that power before, Eo that the
Congressional direction or request would seem to be superfluous.
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already seen that the former is automatically terminated by repeal
of the underlying statute. 6 That repeal of an executive agreement by
act of Congress is equally applicable to those made under the Presi-
dent's independent powers is illustrated by the so-called Gentlemen's
Agreement of 1907 17 permitting limited Japanese immigration, which
was abrogated by the passage of the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1924.8
If further evidence of the vulnerability of an executive agreement is
desired, it may be found in the note appended by the Secretary of
State to the Air Transport Services Agreement with Sweden and Den-
mark,99 reading:
"You vill, of course, understand that this agreement may be
affected by subsequent legislation enacted by the Congress of the
United States." 100
In the Surplus Property Act of 1944 101 there is an express provision
exempting from abrogation prior contracts, construed to cover execu-
tive agreements, like the Canol Project, 10 2 made in contravention of
its provisions for priorities in disposition. Obviously, all future agree-
ments must be made in conformity with the provisions of the Act.
The American Federation of Labor is reported 103 to have objected to
96. Supra, pp. 639-40.
97. See BUELL, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (rev. ed. 1929) 68,736,741.
98. Immigration Act, 43 STAT. 153 (1924), 8 U. S. C. § 201 (1940). The authors (Mc-
Dougal and Lans, Treaties, at 348) incorrectly report this episode and inadvertently mis-
represent Hyde (see ibid., note 186). It led to no negotiation.
99. U.S. ExEc. AGREEX'T SER. Nos. 430 (1944) 4 and 431 (1944) 4.
100. See also agreement of Feb. 10, 1925, with Poland, providing that if either party is
prevented by its legislature from carrying out the agreement, "the obligations thereof shall
thereupon lapse." Quoted in Todd, The President's Power to Make International Agree.
nents (1927) 11 CONST'L REv. 160, 167. See also Fleming, an avowed believer in executive
agreements, who says: "... . Congress, or either branch of it, could take the responsibility
of nullifying an executive agreement." FLEMING, TnE UNITED STATES AND THE WoRLD
COURT (1945) 182.
101. Pub. L. No.457, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 3, 1944) § 34(c).
102. U. S. ExEc. AGREEM'T SER. Nos. 386 (1942), 387 (1942), 388 (1942), 389 (1943),
416 (1944), 444 (1944).
103. N. Y. Times, May 19, 1945, p. 20, col. 3. See AFL Report of Committee on "Free-
dom of the Air," approved by Executive Council May 4, 1945. Arne C. Wiprud, Special
Assistant to the Attorney General, in Some Aspects of Piublic International Air Law (1945)
13 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 247, 264, maintains that bilateral executive agreements have been
entered into for temporary purposes only, until a treaty could be concluded, that multi-
lateral agreements should be incorporated in treaty form, that the Executive should not
purport to fix, much less violate the policy of Congress, and that treaties would be much less
vulnerable to constitutional attack. He says (id. at 266):
"The Executive may act in these matters in one of three ways: he may enter
into executive agreements as an emergency matter to protect and further the in-
terests of the nation; he may enter into particular agreements pursuant to a special
or general authorization by Congress; or he may conclude treaties subject to the
approval of the Senate."
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three of the aviation agreements concluded at Chicago because, pur-
porting to change the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics law, this
should be done by treaty only and not by executive agreement. It is
perhaps superfluous to remark that executive agreements on any sub-
ject are superseded by subsequent treaties inconsistent therewith. 101
5. Effect on Statute. That the Department of State is fully aware of
the distinction between an executive agreement and a treaty in its
effect on a statute is indicated by the following enxtract: "I
". .. it may be desirable to point out here the well recognized
distinction between an executive agreement and a treaty. In brief,
it is that the former cannot alter the existing law and must conform
to all statutory enactments, whereas a treaty, if ratified by and
with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, as required
by the Constitution, itself becomes the supreme law of the land
and takes precedence over any prior statutory enactments." 1c'
The attempt is made to show that the executive agreement made
under the President's independent power prevails over an earlier act of
Congress, just as a treaty does.'17 The evidence used to sustain this
extraordinary proposition is the Washington Territory case of Watts v.
United States."' It is frequently invoked by the authors as conclusive
The Department of State is "of the strong opinion .... that nothing done or pro-
vided for under the three agreements exceeds the authority contained in existing leegla-
tion." (1945) 12 DEP'T OF STATE BULL., No. 312, p. 1103. Cf. article by Latchford, id. at
1104. See also SEN. Doc. No. 56, 79th Cong., 1st Sms. (1945) 16-8.
104. See, e.g., the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917, abrogated by the inconistent
Washington Treaty in 1923, discussed in 53 YALE L. J. 664, at 677.
When the Four-Power Pact (not the Nine-Power Treaty), drawn up at the Wxahing-
ton Conference, vas before the Senate, President Harding said:
"The negotiation of this treaty is in itself the most formal declaration of the
policy of the Executive in relation to China, and supersedes any Executive under-
standing or declaration that could possibly be asserted to have any contrary im-
port. . . . the so-called Lansing-Ishii agreement has no binding effect what-
ever...."
62 CONG. REc. 3559 (1922); see also 5 IcK'WORTa, DIGEST OF Ih-E'r.ATIO.AL LW
(1943) 431.
105. From Current Information Series No. 1, July 3, 1934, quoted in S HAci:wonmh,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL L.W (1943) 425-6.
106. That Norway also considers a treaty to prevail over an inconsiztent executive
agreement is evident in the note of the Norwegian 'Minister to Secretary Hull, U. S. Exe.
AGREE!M'T SER. No. 319 (Dec. 23, 1942) 4.
107. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 317: "A direct Presidential agreement vill not
ordinarily be valid if contrary to previously enacted legislation .... (But) if the subject
of the agreement is a matter vithin the President's special constitutional comp2tence-
related, for example, to the recognition of a foreign government or to an ex ercize of his
authority as Commander-in-Chief-a realistic application of the separation of pover
doctrine might in some situations appropriately permit the President to disrmgard the statute
as an unconstitutional invasion of his ovm power."
108. 1 Wash. Terr. (N. s.) 28S (1870).
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of the President's power to supersede an act of Congress. There the
question was whether by virtue of a military agreement between Great
Britain and the. United States the sole jurisdiction of Washington
Territory over a murder committed on San Juan Island had not been
temporarily replaced by the joint jurisdiction of the two Powers, under
agreement, pending an arbitral award, which later assigned the terri-
tory to the United States. The Washington court held that during
the administration of the tvo Powers sole jurisdiction of Washington
Territory could not be claimed. But since the statute of the Territory,
prior to statehood, was actually an act of Congress, the authors use
the case many times to prove, against a consistent record, that an
executive agreement sets aside an act of Congress. The court did not
suggest such an idea. The gentlemen prove too much. If this esoteric
case established the proposition for which it is used, it would prove
that the President alone, by an executive agreement, can set aside all
acts of Congress at will. Who could take any stock in such a proposi-
tion? 109
6. -"'Law of the Land." A treaty by the Constitution is the "supreme
law of the land"; an executive agreement, with minor exceptions, is
not.110 It seems unusual to conclude that the unmentioned executive
agreement has become so omnipotent that it has made the treaty-
making power of the Senate not only obsolete and a useless encum-
brance, but that by usage the executive agreement has displaced the
treaty in the exalted place the treaty used to occupy. What has been
said and what is still to be said should dissipate any such illusion.
The Altman case"' involved solely the question whether the Su-
preme Court had jurisdiction over the interpretation of an executive
tariff agreement made pursuant to act of Congress, analogous to its
jurisdiction over treaties. The Court decided to consider the agree-
ment like a treaty, while pointing out that it was not a treaty. In the
cases involving the postal "convention" the courts could not agree
whether it was a treaty, a law, or an executive regulation or agreement.
109. Those members of Congress whoin the debate of May 1 to 9, 1945, advocated a
constitutional amendment, shared no such theory. They deplored the abuses of the execu-
tive agreement and maintained that these might continue unless the amendment were
adopted. The authors' concession that the effect of the executive agreement could be
tempered by having Congress approve the executive agreement in what they call a Con-
gressional-Executive agreement, is now unknown and would probably require an amend-
ment to the Constitution. The authors assert (McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 317,
338, 346) that the President "might" disregard acts of Congress and make his own agree-
ments within his unstated constitutional powers, claimed on various pages to be in effect
unlimited (see supra, p. 620). This would make him literally omnipotent. And if he has
power to make his independent executive agreements prevail over acts of Congress, they
must also prevail over treaties.
110. See BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF TnE UNITED STATES (1902) 370.
111. B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U. S. 583 (1912).
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It actually is an administrative regulation carrying out a mandate
from Congress, which has left the power to conclude such agreements
to the Postmaster General and the President. Since it involves no vital
private interest, but at most an administrative matter, it seems proper
to leave the question of reciprocal postal arrangements for letters and
parcels and money orders to an executive official qualified to pass upon
such questions.
That brings up the tariff agreements concluded pursuant to the
Acts of 1890, 1897, 1909, 1922, 1930. In all these cases Congress had
indicated the rates that it wished to apply if the President found cer-
tain facts to exist or if he made a reciprocal agreement with a foreign
country. The constitutionality of the delegation of power in such cases
has been readily sustained in Field v. Clark, Hampton v. United States,
and other federal cases.
But in the Trade Agreements Act a different question is involved.
Here, analogous to the postal cases, Congress delegated the rate-
making power to the Executive within a limit of 50%; the question
raised is the same as in the Panama Refining and Schechtcr cases,
whether Congress can delegate that much legislative power to the
Executive.112 While an argument can be made on both sides, it seems
somewhat unusual to characterize as "ludicrous" "1 the suggestion of
those distinguished Senators and scholars who consider such delegation
to be too great and therefore unconstitutional. So far as the writer is
aware, the Government has not aided the effort to find a justiciable
case which would place that issue before the courts.
The principal court cases involving the executive agreement made
under the President's independent power-aside from the Watts case
in Washington Territory-arose out of the Litvinov assignment of
Russian Government assets in the United States. There Justice
Sutherland in a dictum in the Belmont case had considered the assign-
ment to be "one transaction" with the recognition of the Soviets,1 an
obviously Presidential function. He mentioned this only in connection
with the view that the executive agreement, which was a letter signed
112. Sayre, The Constic noaiily of the Trade Agrecments Act (1939) 39 COL. L. rv.
751, argues that an "intelligible principle" has been laid down in the Act, and that the trade
agreements are like other tariff executive agreements concluded under other act. The
issue turns on the extent of congressional standard or principle and, obversely, of Preciden-
tial discretion. Sayre defines the executive agreement as "embodying adjustments of detail
carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and those involving arrange-
meats of a more or less temporary nature." These "usually take the form of e= cutive
agreements." Id. at 755.
113. McDougal and Lans, Trciles, at 275.
114. "The recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations, the assignment, and
agreements with respect thereto, were all parts of one transaction...." United State3 v.
Belmont, 301 U. S. 324,330 (1937).
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by Litvinov accepted by the President,"' prevailed over state laws. 10
He admitted the assignment was not a treaty. The case arose only on
the motion to dismiss the complaint of the United States, without
regard to the Fifth Amendment or the policy of New York disapprov-
ing extraterritorial confiscations of property in New York. The case is
dangerous and poorly decided because it seems to infer that the Presi-
dent, alone, without legislative support, can change the rights of private
property in the United States.
In the following case, United States v. Pink,"' decided on the author-
ity of the dictum in the Belmont case, Douglas, J., held, for the ma-
jority, over a vigorous dissent of Stone, C. J., and Roberts, J., 11 that
the Soviets had confiscated the property owed by Americans to Russian
citizens in New York and had so intended, that the Litvinov assign-
ment had assigned this property to the President for the United States,
that the Fifth Amendment protecting the foreign stockholder and
creditor from confiscation could be disregarded by the United States, 11'
and that New York policy opposing extraterritorial confiscation was
overruled by the assignment. In spite of the fact that no other foreign
country has given to Russian confiscations applied to foreign-situs
115. The letter provides, inter alia, that the "Government of the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics will not take any steps to enforce any decisions of courts or initiate any
new litigations for the amounts admitted to be due or that may be found to be due it, as the
successor of prior Governments of Russia, or otherwise, from American nationals. .. ."
United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 212 (1942). No one present apparently thought that
this included anything but Russian Government assets or that it included American private
property not owed to the Russian Government. Otherwise, the Solicitor General would
hardly have argued that the reason the Russian Government could seize the money was
because the credit had a "locus" in Russia. The assignment related only to assets to collect
which the Soviets could bring suit here. Would anyone have thought that the Soviets could
get a judgment confiscating American-held property?
116. The superiority of treaties over state laws extend to "all international compacts and
agreements from the very fact that complete power over international affairs is in the
national government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the
part of the several states." United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 331 (1937) (emphasis
supplied). There is no suggestion here that a treaty and an executive agreement are "en-
tirely upon a par," as the authors claim. MeDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 261.
117. 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
118. Stone, C. J., dissenting, said (id. at 242): "As my brethren are content to rest their
decision on the authority of the dictum in United States v. Belmont . . . without the aid of
any pertinent decision of this Court, I think a word should be said of the authority and
reasoning of the Belmont case and of the principles which I think are controlling here."
119. Yet the authors say, as to treaties: "It can be taken for granted that the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment and other specific substantive provisions of the
Constitution constitute limitations on the provisions which can be enforced as parts of
approved and ratified treaties." McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 315. I agree with the
authors rather than with the Court, for the executive agreement can hardly afford the
Executive more discretion than a treaty. As to the binding force of the Fifth Amendment
on the treaty or agreement see Littauer, The Unfreezing of Foreign Funds (1945) 45 CoL. L.
Rv. 132, 162 etseg.
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property extraterritorial effect, and that Russian lawyers assure me
that the Soviet law did not purport to confiscate foreign-held property,
the Court held that the agreement, as an incident of recognition and
the settlement of claims, had "a similar dignity" as a treaty. -  Never
in American history has such a conclusion as to extraterritorial con-
fiscations or a simple executive agreement been reached, but on its
foundation the gentlemen's thesis rests. The fact that the executive
agreement had "a similar dignity" only so far as concerns its effect on
recognition and in overruling state policy is not emphasized. The
Belmont case had used the analogy of protocols, modi vkiendi, tariff
agreements, etc.,-all "routine" in character or made under act of
Congress; the citation of John Bassett Moore's article shows that no
wide extension of the analogy, was intended. The Pink case held the
assignment not to be a treaty, but so far as concerned New York
policy to have the same overriding effect. -12 '
The Pink decision raises several questions. If this was a settlement
of claims, why was about $5 millions accepted and -300 millions
practically sacrificed? The $300 millions of unpaid American claims
arising out of confiscations in Russia was the ostensible reason for
non-recognition. Russian confiscations of property in New York were
not mentioned. The settlement of the $300 millions of claims arising
out of Russian confiscations in Russia, instead of being made a condi-
tion precedent, was made only a condition or promise subsequent, and
the Soviets have never gotten around to madng a settlement. If the
claims are regarded as valid in international law, they have been
jeopardized by the unfounded dictum, repeated unwisely since the
Oetjen case,. 22 that recognition "validates" the acts of the revolution
from the beginning of its existence. "Validates" doubtless was intended
to mean "authenticates." If debts owed by Americans to Russians in
New York have been confiscated, why has not Russian privately-
120. That United States v. Pink was confined to the effect of an assignment coincident
with recognition and its effect on local laws contrary thereto, see Note (1945) SS HAnv. L.
REv. 612, 614. Douglas, J., says (315 U. S. at 230): "Recognition and the Litvinov Aczign-
meat were interdependent." He is still referring to recognition when he says (iid.): "A
treaty is a 'Law of the Land' under the supremacy clause (Art. VI, Cl. 2) of the Constitu-
tion. Such international compacts and agreements as the Litvinov Aszignment have a
similar dignity." By referring to John Bassett Mloore's article on Treaties and Exe .sfere
Agreements (1902) 20 PoL. ScI. Q. 3S5, he indicates that the executive agreement has limited
functions to perform and is not, as the authors would have it, on a "par in every resp2ct"
with the treaty. In the next paragraph he refers, as the Belmont case did, to the fact that
the Litvinov assignment prevails over New York public policy.
121. It was not "squarely held" (McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 311) in the Bemngi
and Pink cases that "agreements made under the President's independent constitutional
authority were binding on all courts ...... " Ibid. Only one, the Litvinov as ignmnt, was
upheld, because that was an incident of recognition, an executive function.
122. See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 302 (1918); United States v.
Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 233 (1942).
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owned property in New York been confiscated? If the Russian con-
fiscations in Russia are deemed invalid, how is it that the confiscations
in New York are deemed valid, or at least condoned, since the United
States becomes the beneficiary? The New York courts still seem to
hold that foreign confiscations are invalid in New York when the
United States does not become the beneficiary. 123 From the slender
authority of the Pink case, criticized as erroneous by the Chief Justice
and by numerous students of the subject, 124 no such far-reaching con-
clusion as the interchangeability of treaty and executive agreement
can be inferred.
The Curtiss-Wright decision 125 involved a Presidential embargo laid
under the provisions of an act of Congress. A dictum as to the scope of
federal power admitted that the President was bound by the Constitu-
tion, 2 and said nothing to promote the prestige of the executive agree-
ment. In so far as the dictum related to the case before the Court, it
extolled only the President's unlimited power of "negotiation" and
"inquiry," which would hardly be denied. For the rest, historians
have challenged the Justice's views of the "inherent power" of the
Federal Government over foreign affairs. In his Blumenthal Lectures
at Columbia University in 1918 he himself had plainly stated that he
considered the executive agreement as carrying only a "moral" obliga-
tion, administrative in nature. 12
The authors' opus under reply criticizes my view that the executive
agreement was only a supplementary device designed to accomplish
minor arrangements within the limited powers of the Executive to
deal with diplomatic affairs and as Commander-in-Chief '2 -leaving
aside his delegated functions carrying out an act of Congress. The
nature of what the President could do was quite well understood up to
the time of the studies published before 1930. To be sure, the military
powers opened the door to armistices and the war of 1917 led to the
Lansing-Ishii Agreement of that year, with its secret clause. The
only way to account for the few important agreements concluded
without the Senate is to assume that the Senate tacitly or by imple-
menting legislation acquiesced in them.
123. Bollack v. Soci6t6 Gn6rale, 263-App. Div. 601, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 986 (1st Dep't
1942).
124. See Borchard, Extraterritorial Confiscations (1942) 36 Am. J. INT. L. 275 and cita-
tions in 53 YALE L. J. 664,682, n. 67.
125. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
126. Sutherland, J.: " 'For his conduct [the President] is responsible to the Constitu-
tion.' "Id. at 319, quoting from a report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
1816. ". . . which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in
subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution." Id. at 320. "It was not
within the power of the President to repeal the Joint Resolution. . . . Congress alone
could do that." Id. at 331-2.
127. See SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS (1919) 120.
128. See in support of this view Wright, The United States and International Agreerments
(1944) 38 Am. J. INT. L. 341,351, and passim.
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Since 1933 there has been a considerable extension in the use of the
executive agreement, and it has been employed for purposes never
contemplated by statesmen or writers before 1930. This movement
was accelerated since the Ciertiss-Wright decision in 1937, avowing a
wide inherent power of the Federal Government to deal with foreign
affairs. But these examples of the expanded employment of the execu-
tive agreement instead of treaty are not evidence of approved practice
but of the encroachment of the Executive on the Senate prerogative.
They are not "usage," but "abuse of power." As remarked before the
Senate Committee on Commerce, -' which was primarily interested in
this question of encroachment by the Executive, if the Senate ac-
quiesces often enough in this invasion of its rights, even under the
guise of the war power, they may ultimately lose in practice, though
not in law, their constitutional power. They are now earnestly en-
gaged in restoring the treaty power to its constitutional status and it
seems that the Constitution will not be further upset. The movement
had gone so far that an official of the Treaty Di-ision actually wrote a
large volume in 1941, adopting the thesis that anything that could be
done by treaty could now be done by executive agreement. In re-
viewing that book I ventured to question the validity of the thesis.' 3
The authors under reply adopt the same argument, but temper the
thesis by requiring the approval of Congress instead of the Senate two-
thirds rule, thus proposing a solution devoid of practical merit.
Important cases in which the Congress has "authorized" the Execu-
tive to act,' 3' such as joining the ILO and other international bodies,
settling the war debts or entering into reciprocal tariff agreements,
both to be approved by Congress, do not demonstrate that the execu-
tive agreement is a constitutional compact or is like a treaty. The
Atlantic Charter, 32 ostensibly recorded on scraps of paper, can hardly
be called the "supreme law of the land." The President's agreements
to submit claims in favor of the United States to international arbitra-
tion have not been so designated. Even his pledge not to make sepa-
rate peace in so-called World War II has not been so characterized.
We all know that he has wide authority as a diplomatic officer and
Commander-in-Chief to make certain agreements on his own responsi-
bility with foreign Powers. But no authority (except the Pinh case,
as to the Litvinov assignment, and other cases where Congress directed
129. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce on S. 13S5, 78th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1944) 151.
130. Book Review [of MCCLURE, INmnNiTio , L E.mcunmn Ac;r EE;TS (1941) 1
(1942) 42 COL. L. REV. S87.
131. See McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 205, 238-44.
132. U. S. Ex~c. AGREE,'T SEa. No. 236 (1941) 4; it is incorporated by reference in the
agreement on war aims made by the executive with Soviet Russia. U. S. Ezc. AnrMn'T
SER. No. 253 (1942).
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the making of the agreement) has ventured to raise any of these to the
category of constitutional treaties or the "law of the land." The same
is true of the agreements, published and unpublished, made at Yalta,133
Casablanca, Teheran and other foreign parts. Indeed, the "destroyer
deal," whose legal validity I have questioned 134 as an act of var,
gives rise to the question whether the power as Commander-in-Chief
has not been unduly employed and should not be restricted by Con-
gress. 135
7. Modification. It is blandly asserted by the gentlemen that "It
has long been established that the President may modify a previously
ratified treaty by an executive agreement with the obligee nation if the
133. "President Truman ...can place his own interpretations on the Yalta under.
standings.". Crawford, TheDouble Talk of the Liberals (May 1945) COMMON SENSE 6,9.
134. Borchard, The Attorney General's Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers for Naval
Bases (1940) 34 Am. J. INT. L. 690; 53 YALE L. J. 664, 676, n. 41. Professor Corwin also
challenges it as a misconstruction of two acts of Congress. Corwin, Dumbarton Oaks and the
Consttution-An Interview in MONEY AD THE LAW (N. Y. U. L. Q. SuPP. 1945) 131,138.
135. It should be noted that practically all the cases mentioned by the authors in Part IV
are executive agreements made pursuant to act of Congress. The Senate Committee is now
withholding its assent to the aviation treaty, pending an explanation as to why four other
Chicago agreements were concluded as executive agreements. The oil and the St. Lawrence
agreements have been mentioned. The wheat agreement should have been adopted as a
treaty.
The first part of the authors' Part IV (McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 262-8) deals
with acquisition of territory and shows not the interchangeability of executive agreements
and of treaties, but of acts of Congress and treaties in certain matters. By italicizing Presi-
dent Tyler's justification of any means for accomplishing a desired result (" '. . . The
'great question is not as to the manner in which it shall be done . . .' ", id. at 263), the authors
may suggest their approval of the philosophy that the end justifies the means.
Justice White in the Insular cases (id. at 267) held that an act of Congress was necessary
to "incorporate" territory after a treaty was signed to annex it. The United States lins
never been squeamish as to the particular devices used, treaty or joint resolution, in annex-
ing territory. The "series of trade agreements ... negotiated in the 1820-1840 period"
(id. at 273) were local arrangements alleged to have been made by naval officers or mer-
chant vessel captains with native chieftains in Tahiti and Sulu. The Altman case (cited
id. at 274) involved only a question of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, not the validity
of trade agreements.
The Texas and Hawaii annexations are characterized as accomplished by Congressional-
Executive agreement as a method of annexation (McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 308).
This seems unjustified. It was done by joint resolution of Congress alone. See WRIGUT, TuE
CONTROL OF AMERIcAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922) 275. Texas and Hawaii wdre both
absorbed so that there was no one to question the annexation by Congress. The exchange of
joint resolutions or a supposed "offer and acceptance" is only figuratively an executive agree-
ment. No mention is made of the fact that the slavery issue, Mexico's threat to make the
treaty a casus belli, and Congressional dislike of Tyler, had anything to do with the defeat
of the treaty. See MooRE, THE PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (1918) 350.
No executive agreement has ever been declared invalid because few have been con-
sidered and those few'have been tariff and postal agreements, embargoes, etc., under "au.
thority" of Congress, with the principal exception of the Litvinov assignment. Possibly the
Watts case and Tucker v. Alexandroff exemplify simple executive agreements under the
President's power.
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agreement is within his constitutional powers." 133 Again, it is said
that "executive agreements have not infrequently been utilized as a
method of altering treaties." 117 This would be a startling proposition
if true. It would mean that after a treaty has had the formal approval
of the Senate, the President alone could modify or alter the treaty and
by executive agreement change its tenor, its character and its terms.
To announce such a proposition is to answer the assertion. It is in fact
contradicted by a uniform practice, 33 in which this government has
repeatedly disavowed the power of the Executive to waive, alter or
modify treaties concluded with the vote of the Senate.
In response to a request from Cuba to waive the preferential tariff
on sugar, as provided under the Treaty of 1902, the Department of
State took the position that "the Department of State has no power
to waive the American tariff preference on sugar or any other article
included in the treaty with Cuba. Such waiver would be a partial
abrogation of that treaty, which would require the concurrence of the
legislative branch of the Government." 1'3
The United States enjoyed extraterritorial rights in Morocco under
a treaty of 1836. France gradually took over the administration of the
country and asked the United States to adhere to an agreement be-
tween France and Germany of 1910. The Department of State replied
that:
as the adherence of this Government to such an agreement
would seem to imply the modification of certain of its existing
treaty rights, the consent to such adherence on the part of the
United States involves the conjoint action of the treaty-making
powers of this Government and our acceptance of the agreement in
question could therefore be made only by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate." 10
Again, when France in 1919 wished to extend the treaty of 1822 by
tacit renewal until it was replaced by a new treaty, the Department
replied:
136. 11cDougal and Lans, Trcaties, at 317.
137. Id. at 334. See also id. at 209 ("numerous precedents Eanction us2 of a cimple
executive agreement to alter a treaty or any other international compact"), 243 (the Prei-
dent has "authority to enter into agreements which supplement or modify treaties"), 316
("executive agreements have been frequently used to modify or clarify treaties").
138. Recorded in 5 HIcswOR'rH, DIGEST OF INrErxATroN.%L LA (1943) 333-3. The
Franklin episode involved an interpretation by Franklin of the Treaty vith France of 1773,
under instruction from the Continental Congress. See mcCLurE, I,,-rrfZATO.,NL. Exrcu-
Tiv AGREEMENTS (1941) 37.
139. FoREIGN RELATIONS: 1911 at 106. See also HL*cKvEorTn;, op. cit. stipra note 133,
at 333.
140. FoREIGN RELATIONS: 1911 at 622. See also I-cLrwonTr, op. cit. supra note 133,
at 333.
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". .. the Government of the United States is not in a position
to agree to the proposal. . . .The suggestion of the French Gov-
ernment amounts . . . .in my opinion, to a proposal to modify the
terms of a provision of the treaty, a proposal which is not sus-
ceptible of execution on the part of the Government of the United
States in the manner suggested .... 141
Even Congress cannot modify a treaty. In an opinion of the Solicitor
for the Department of State in 1920 he advised the Secretary:
". .. Congress may pass an act violative of a treaty. It may
express its sense that a treaty should be terminated. But it cannot
in effect undertake legally to modify a treaty no matter what meth-
ods it may employ. In doing that it, in effect, attempts to conduct
diplomatic negotiations and to encroach on the treaty-making
power composed of the President and the Senate." 142
This is not to say that the President has not occasionally interpreted
the meaning of treaties by exchange of notes, 143 suspended the opera-
tion of a treaty temporarily, 144 or extended its duration temporarily. 14
On occasion he has even been considered the societal agent of the
United States who could give notice of the termination of a treaty, but
rarely has he done even this without assuring himself of the support
of the House or Senate or both. 41
On the other hand, he feels free to bring about a change in executive
agreements concluded within his powers without consulting the Senate.
This can be done by a new agreement or unilateral withdrawal from an
old one.
8. Submission. A treaty is submitted to the Senate in a formal
procedure for its full and free consideration. The Senate may consent
to it, 41 reject it, amend it and make reservations. There is no provi-
141. 2 FOREIGN RELATIONs: 1919 at 229-30. See also HAcKWORam, op. cit. sitpra note
138, at 334.
In answer to a request to modify the tariff treaty with Muscat, the Department re-
plied: ". . . In view of constitutional requirements, however, the United States is not in a
position to enter into an exchange of notes the purpose of which is to amend an existing
treaty." Quoted in HACEWORTH, op. cit. supra note 138, at 335. There are numerous other
notes to the same effect printed in HACKWORTR.
142. Quoted in HACKWORTI1, op. cit. supra note 138, at 324.
143. Protocol of Sept. 2, 1937, interpreting Art. I of the Extradition Treaty with Greece,
51 STAT. 357 (1931); cf. agreement with France, Feb. 23 and March 4, 1933, 48 STAT. 1769,
interpreting Art. 7 of the Consular Convention of 1853.
144. See HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 138, at 338.
145. See WILSON, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1939) 225-6; 32 STAT.
1839 (1899); HERSHEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMAcY OF TnE Russo-JAPANESE
WAR (1906) 318 n. (tacit acquiescence in continuance of expiring Hague Declaration on
Projectiles during the Russo-Japanese War). Cf. 50 STAT. 1433 (1936).
146. See HAcKwoRTH, op. cit. supra note 138, at 319 el seq., 329; 2 HAYNES, TnE SENATE
OF THE UNITED STATES (1938) 671.
147. Up to 1928, only 234 out of 820 treaties had been in any way "tampered" with,
i.e., not approved as submitted. See DANGERFIELD, IN DEFENSE OF THE SENATE (1933)
256-7. This includes amendment, rejections, reservations or omission to approve.
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sion for the submission of an executive agreement, as its name indicates,
to either house. The "Congressional-Executive" agreement proposed
by the gentlemen is only possible within those limits circumscribing the
power of Congress in Article I, Section 8, whereupon the Executive
may make such an agreement as Congress provides for. In spite of the
persuasive use by the gentlemen, repeated many times, of the phrase
"authorization or sanction," the practice of submitting to the Congress
executive agreements of either type, authorized or independent, for
ratification or approval, is unknom to the Constitution. It would at
once give rise to a conflict with the Senate, as did the Aiken St. Law-
rence bill designed to carry into effect the commitments made in the
independently concluded executive agreement of March 19, 1941, with
Canada. That was the nearest approach of which the writer is aware
to what the gentlemen have in mind.
But far from winning the approval of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, it seems to have met their overwhelming disapproval. The
reason is not far to seek. Instead of "submitting" the agreement to the
Congress--it replaced a similar treaty defeated in 1934-it vas sent
to the Congress merely for its "information." The instrument differed,
however, from the usual executive agreement, which goes into force on
signature, in that it was made subject to the approval of Congress. Yet
Congress had no opportunity to consider the agreement, to amend it
or make reservations. The only request upon Congress was embodied
in the Aiken bill, introduced nearly four years after the agreement.
The bill may be deemed to have incorporated the agreement by refer-
ence and provided by its passage for approval, and by its defeat for
disapproval. But the agreement itself was not officially before Con-
gress, and of course it could not be changed. The Senate on Decem-
ber 12, 1944, rejected the Aiken bill by a vote of 25 to 56, 14 not vot-
ing, '- in part owing to the novelty of the procedure, since there is much
support for the merits of the project. Assistant Secretary Berle made
the suggestion that the reason for sending the agreement for the
"information" of both houses to be approved by a separate bill instead
of submitting it as a treaty to the Senate, was premised on the belief
that the matter was so important that it seemed preferable to let both
houses pass upon it instead of merely one, where a minority might
defeat it. The explanation did not seem to strike the Senate Commerce
Committee as very convincing.':
Let us assume that the Aiken bill could have been amended as Con-
gress desired, and in the end have differed considerably from the agree-
148. 90 Cong. Rec., Dec. 12, 1944, at 9332.
149. See Hearings before the Commitce on Rirers and Harbors on c: Sblject of tA: In-
provzeent of tik Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway and Powcr Projct, 77th Cong., 1st S= .
(1941) 45; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Coinmitlce on Conmrree on S. 1395, 7S3th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) 199.
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ment of 1941. The gentlemen under reply say that "there is no pro-
cedure by which the President can be compelled to resubmit a modified
agreement to-the other nations concerned for further negotiations." "0
And yet this seems to be constitutional in the authors' view. It would
be interesting to find out which instrument controls the United States-
the agreement or the Aiken bill which modifies it-and which instru-
ment controls Canada. The authors explain this as the President's
power "in many situations .. .to disregard the Senatorial or Con-
gressional veto and consummate agreements on his own responsibility."
Thus the President, according to the gentlemen and their novel pro-
posal, is able to defy Congress. This is hardly a persuasive argument
for scotching the Senate.
Reference may here be made to the repeated assertion of the gentle-
men that the House by its power over appropriations has the power to
object to treaties 151 and leave them presumably without force. Apart
from the fact that the House has never failed to implement a treaty by
appropriating the funds called for, they have no such right, though
they might have the power to violate the obligation of the United
States. The treaty is a binding obligation of the United States as soon
as it has been ratified by the President, after submission to and ap-
proval by the Senate. After that the House is under a duty to carry
out the treaty by making the necessary appropriation, though individ-
ual members have occasionally asserted in debate that the House had
the constitutional power to refuse an appropriation. 5 ' If they exer-
cised this power, they would violate an obligation of the United States
which the country must vindicate as best it may. The late Senator
Burton of Ohio was perhaps the last student of the subject to analyze
this problem. 153 Ex-President Taft has expressed himself as follows
upon it:
".... Congress .. .is bound in honor [to make appropria-
tions required by treaty, and when it refuses] it is merely violating
the plighted faith of the government. Just so, it may abrogate a
treaty obligation by statute, but it does not annul the obliga-
tion." 164
150. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 209.
151. Id. at210,240,336,344.
152. Mr. Henry Tucker, a Member of the House in 1922, seemed to think so. 62 CoNG.
REc. 7064 (1922).
153. Id. at 7069 et seg., and in a separate pamphlet, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER-
CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT (1922).
154. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND His POWERS (1925) 115. See also Wright,
The United States and International Agreements (1944) 38 Am!. J. INT. L. 341, 343. Such
failure might "nullify" an executive agreement. See CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING
AND ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 1916) 177. Failure of Congress to make an implementing ap-




Congress is rarely called on to make an appropriation to carry into
effect an executive agreement. It was indirectly done in making ap-
propriations to build a lighthouse on Horseshoe Reef and for the naval
bases in 1941, months after the "destroyer deal" of 1940. It is believed
that this may be considered a Congressional approval of these transac-
tions, though ratification or consent of Congress w.-as not sought. The
Panama transaction of 1942 wras justified as an implementation of the
treaties of 1903 and 1936, though Professor Briggs says it really in-
volved the execution of the unpublished second executive agreement of
May 18, 1942.111 Appropriations have been and will be required to
carry out the UNRRA. Large appropriations would have been re-
quired for the unratified St. Lawrence project. In all those cases the
critic may find an effort to circumvent the Senate, as was occasionally
charged on the floor, but there is a natural tendency, when an appro-
priation is needed, to avoid approaching Congress twice. In the
execution of an executive agreement, it is believed, the House of Repre-
sentatives has a genuine discretion which they do not have in the case
of appropriations executing a treaty.'"I
Much criticism has been levelled by the authors against the two-
thirds constitutional rule. 1 7 The two-thirds rule has defeated very
155. See 53 YALE L. J. 664,675.
156. In the recent executive agreement with Peru for anthropological research and in-
vestigation, U. S. ExEc. AG EEU'T SEE. No. 433 (1944) there is a provision that it ohall not
continue in effect if "the Congress of either country rhall fail to make available the funds
necessary for its execution." Such a clause is not found, so far as I am ar,-are, in any of the
treaties of the United States. It occurs, however, in several executive agreements. Where
the President wishes to avoid committing the Congress to make appropriations, he avoids
making a treaty but substitutes a message to Congres recommending an appropriation.
See Karlin, The Indemnification of Aliens Injured by Mob Violence (1945) 25 S. V. Soc. Sci.
Q.235.
The arbitration treaties submitted to the Senate between 1397 and 1911 (IcDougal
and Lans, Treaties, Part II, at 55S) were merely promises to arbitrate legal questions-
excepting all those which are likely to be important. It was fashionable at this pericd to
favor general arbitration treaties. While the Senate may have been overcautious in cub-
stituting the word "treaty" for the word "special agreement," implying that the agreement
to arbitrate must be submitted to their supervision in each case, they cannot be said to have
interfered with any particular arbitration. To justify the criticism made by the authors it
would be necessary to show that the State Department has deired to arbitrate a case which
the Senate has frustrated. No such evidence can be shown. Secretary Root had no difficulty
in acceding to the Senate's wishes in 1903, and thereupon two important arbitrations with
Great Britain were held.
157. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, Part II, at 55S. To show that it is not unuual to
require a two-thirds vote for important decisions, as treaty-maling was conceived to be
(cf. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 190), a paragraph from the Dumbarton Oaks pro-
posals for two-thirds vote of the Assembly on certain important matters may be quoted:
"2. Important decisions of the General Assembly, including recommendations
with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security; election of
members of the Security Council; election of members of the Economic and Social
Council; admission of members, suspension of the exercie of the rights and privi-
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few treaties. Fleming notes seven and Quincy Wright says less than a
dozen. Representative Adams, in a table published in the debate on
May 9, 1945,158 maintains that the constitutional amendment proposed
by Representative Schwabe, ultimately adopted, requiring a majority
of the membership, 218 in the House and 49 in the Senate, would have
defeated all the treaties except 3. While offered as a compromise when
it was apparent to the Chairman, Representative Hatton Sumners,
that a two-thirds vote on his original resolution "I for majority vote of
those present could not be obtained, it is open to doubt, if the amend-
ment is ever approved, whether 218 and 49 will be easier to obtain than
a two-thirds Senate vote of those present.
Quincy Wright offers different statistics of some 1,000 formal treaties,
indicating that a quarter were never perfected, and that of these 250
leges of members, and expulsion of members; and budgetary questions, should be
made by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. On other questions,
including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a
two-thirds majority, the decisions of the General Assembly should be made by a
simply majority vote."
Dumbarton Oaks Draft, c. V, § C (1944) 11 DEP'T OF STATE BULL., No. 276, p. 369. See
Art. 18 of San Francisco Charter for somewhat similar provision.
It is common in all constitutions of which I am aware to make important matters sub-
ject to a decisive vote, and there were special historical reasons for making.two-thirds of the
Senators present an essential part of the treaty-making power.
Senator Oscar Underwood, whose resolution for adoption of the Versailles Treaty with-
out reservation was overwhelmingly defeated, is quoted (91 Cong. Rec., May 2, 1945, at
4114) as having said:
"The makers of the Constitution were so careful that a treaty should reflect the
mature sentiment of the people of the United States that they required that its
ratification should receive a vote of two-thirds of the membership of this body."
It would be a curious evolution if the President, who was brought into the treaty-
making procedure only in the last days of the Convention, on September 7, 1787, should now
submerge the Senate, whose power he was directed to share. That the agreement was not
the ill-considered device it is occasionally represented to be, we quote from Alexander
Hamilton's account in the Camillus Papers, 7 WoRxs OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (John C.
Hamilton, ed., 1850-51) 518:
"As to the sense of the convention, the secrecy with which their deliberations
were conducted, does not permit any formal proof of the opinions and views which
prevailed in digesting the power of treaty. But from the best opportunity of knowiig
the fact, I aver, that it was understood by all, to be the intent of the provision to give
to that power the most ample latitude-to render it competent to all the stipula-
tions, which the exigencies of national affairs might require; competent to the mak-
ing of treaties of alliance, treaties of commerce, treaties of peace, and every other
species of convention usual among nations; and competent, in the course of its exer-
cise for these purposes, to control and bind the legislative power of Congress. And
it was emphatically for this reason, that it was so carefully guarded; the coopera-
tion of two-thirds of the Senate, with the President, being required to make any
treaty whatever. I appeal for this, with confidence, to every member of the con-
vention-particularly to those in the two houses of Congress."
158. 91 Cong. Rec., May 9, 1945, at4423.
159. H.J. Res. 60,79th Cong., 1st Sess.
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unperfected treaties, some 50 were withdrawn or not ratified by the
President, some 75 were killed by Senate amendments unacceptable to
the President or to the other Power, and about 125 were killed by
Senate rejection or inaction.CO In exercising its power of intervention
in approximately one-quarter of the treaties submitted, the Senate
exercised its constitutional duty only. It is understood that John T.
Flynn will shortly publish a pamphlet on the subject showing that the
two-thirds rule defeated very few treaties and improved many. It
seems extraordinary to base objections to the Senate on the rejection
of the Treaty of Versailles, since no Senator lost his seat by reason of
his vote. I have already stated that Woodrow Wilson was responsible
for the defeat by not accepting the reservations which were perfectly
agreeable to the British and others.'
9. Durability. A treaty lasts just as long as its terms provide-vith
minor exceptions too unusual to notice.12 The term is occasionally
unstated and left indefinite, subject to termination by a specific notice
of a given number of months, usually six or tvelve. As a rule, the
notice is given by the President after joint resolution of Congress or
resolution of the Senate. On rare occasions, the President has taken
the initiative, either notifying Congress or assuming their acquiescence.
Haynes says:
"Denunciation of treaties has usually been by Joint Resolution,
originating sometimes in the House, sometimes in the Senate." IC3
President Wilson declined to enforce Section 34 of the Jones Act,
requiring him to abrogate thirty-two commercial treaties prohibiting
discriminatory duties, not because he considered that the Executive
was superior to Congress or that Congress was impinging on the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine, as the authors suggest, 14 but because he did
160. Wright, Tle United States and International Agreements (1944) 33 Au. J. I.r. L.
341,353.
161. 53 YALE L. J. 650,665.
The authors' inferential laudation of the Treaty of Versailles (McDougal and Lans,
Treaties, at 191-2) we can safely leave to history. In the meantime, numerous distinguizhed
authorities, like Ambassador Bullitt and T r. Herridge, formerly Canadian Minister to the
United States, have expressed themselves in print. One may quote from the worh of John
Bassett loore the remark that
"In a current volume on China, a Chinese sage is reported to have declared
that the Versailles Treat, was 'the most uncivilized papa vritten since men lnew.
how to record thought' and to have prophesied that it would 'not only upset the
economic balance of the world but lead to more wars.'"
6 COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN B.%ssrrr AMoorE (1944) 432. See also commentary from
KYEs, THE EcozoIc CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEAcn (1920) 37-55, reprinted in 91 Cong.
Rec., May 2, 1945, at 4132 ct seq.
162. It is impossible for me to see why the authors devote so many pages to rekns sic
stantib-as and other doctrines of treaty la. (McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 339-343).
163. 2 HAixEs, Tm SENTE OF Tm UNITED STANTES (1933) 670. See aho 5 Hcr-
woRTH, DIGEST OF IN ERATIONAL LAW (1943) 319 et seq.
164. See McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 347-8. See also id. at 317,333.
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not think they could or really intended to require him to breach and
violate, not legally terminate, thirty-two commercial treaties.' The
treaties concerning deserters were lawfully terminated under the direc-
tion given in the Seamen's Act of 1915.6
An executive agreement, on the other hand, is terminable at any
time at the unilateral wish of one of the parties."6 7 This is said despite
the fact that it is now becoming customary to make trade agreements
for two or three years, subject to termination or mutual extension,
health and sanitation agreements for a specific time, usually short,
naval and military mission agreements up to four years, and agricul-
tural experiment station agreements up to ten years. They frequently
provide "unless terminated or extended," sometimes without stating
how this shall be done. Sometimes the executive agreement runs for a
given period, expressly terminable by notice.
But it is believed that none of these agreements legally binds the
nation, because unratified by the Senate. It seems to me that any
future President is completely unbound and perfectly free to cancel
the agreement if he so desires.118 The fact that numerous modi vivendi
165. 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1943) 323. See also Dep't of
State, Press Release, Sept. 24, 1920, reprinted ibid.:
". .. the President was directed within ninety days after the Act became
law, to notify the several Governments, with whom the United States had entered
into commercial treaties, that this country elected to terminate so much of said
treaties, as restricted the right of the United States to impose discriminating cus-
toms duties on imports and discriminatory tonnage dues, according as the carrier
vessels were domestic or foreign, quite regardless of the fact that these restrictions
are mutual, operating equally upon the other Governments which are parties to the
treaties, and quite regardless also of the further fact that the treaties contain no
provisions for their termination in the manner contemplated by Congress.
"The President, therefore, considers it misleading to speak of the 'termination'
of the restrictive clauses of such treaties. The action sought to be imposed upon
the Executive would amount to nothing less than the breach or violation of said
treaties. . .. Such a course would be wholly irreconcilable with the historical
respect which the United States has shown for its international engagements, and
would falsify every profession of our belief in the binding force and the reciprocal
obligation of treaties in general."
Congress acquiesced in this policy.
President Wilson did not decline "to terminate the Congressionally proscribed provi-
sions of ...executive agreements" (McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 347), because there
were none. Congress said nothing about executive agreements in 41 STAT. 988. MCCLURE,
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS (1941) 23-4, the authors' source of authority,
makes no mention of any executive agreement.
166. See 5 HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1943) 328.
167. See Todd, The President's Power to Make International Agreements (1927) 11
CONST'L REv. 160, 167; WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922)
236; COLEGROVE, THis AMERICAN SENATE AND WORLD PEACE (1944) 105. See correspond-
ence in re "Taft Agreement" with Panama, abrogated in 1923, in 5 HACEWORT11, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1943) 432.
168. See COLEGROVE, THE AMERICAN SENATE AND WORLD PEACE (1944) 105.
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and other agreements have been permitted by succeeding Presidents to
stand unaltered by renewal or otherwise, such as the provisions of the
unratified Bayard-Chamberlain Treaty of 1888, which wmas kept alive
by modi vivendi until 1912, is no evidence at all of the fact that it was
not necessary to renew it by nwdi viendi or Keep it alive by consent.
It may be unilaterally terminated at any time. " '
Quite different is the status of a treaty. That cannot in the absence
of express agreement be terminated at the will of one of the parties.
The very fact that it is a binding international obligation precludes a
country from escaping that obligation prematurely. Even an act of
Congress departing from the treaty does not relieve the country of its
liability thereunder. The difference from the executive agreement is
fundamental. It is the same as between a tenancy for life or a fixed
term and a tenancy at will.
10.- Secrecy. One of the major objections to the extension of the use
of executive agreements is the opportunity they afford for secrecy.
The Roosevelt-Katsura Agreement of 1905 was not known until 1924,
when Tyler Dennett disclosed it; the Lansing-Ishii Agreement had a
secret clause unknown until 1922; the Yalta agreement secretly pro-
vided for three votes for Soviet republics. These agreements are now
known. How many unknown agreements have thus been entered into
we may not know for the indefinite future.
No such opportunity is available in the case of treaties. We have
never had a secret treaty or secret clause of a treaty, as is common to
European diplomacy. The provision for publicity as a condition of
its binding character preclude such secrecy, and not only the practice
but the theory of treaty-making forecloses the possibility of secrecy.
That is an asset to be appreciated, not deprecated.
This analysis of some of the principal differences between the treaty
and the executive agreement will have served as a sufficient com-
mentary upon the authors' allegations concerning "the identical legal
consequences of treaties and executive agreements." 170
IV
If it is true that the limitations on the powers of Congress deal only
with its power to legislate on domestic affairs and not with its power
to authorize or sanction agreements with foreign Powers, then Con-
gress can arrogate to itself by the same majorities that enact legislation
the power to control all subjects which could become the subject of
executive agreements with foreign Powers. As will presently be ob-
served, they could thus acquire jurisdiction over all state matters.
169. See authorities cited supra note 167.
170. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at 307.
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The only difference between a treaty and a statute would be that in
one case the President signs first and in the second case the President
signs last. Nor is this all. If Congress could acquire control over the
matters in question because they become the subject of international
agreement, it could also enact legislation to carry out the international
agreement and thus acquire domestic jurisdiction over the subject, as
Missouri v. Holland clearly indicates. At least in requiring two-thirds
vote of the Senate some check upon an ambitious President was
provided. Under the new proposal, there are to be no checks, as will
presently appear, if the President is of the same party as the majority
in both houses; and a treaty becomes practically the equivalent of a
statute. In the fact that the President and a subservient majority of
the party in control could by the simple device employed in a statute
(omitting the gentlemen's suggestion that the President could dis-
regard the action of Congress and make his own agreements 11) assume
federal control of any matter we find an exotic method of changing the
Constitution. Little more need be said to show the impropriety of the
Congressional-Executive agreement which the gentlemen advocate.
It is the writer's belief that if the gentlemen's proposal or the con-
stitutional amendment for majority vote were ever to be adopted,
voting on treaties might become more political whenever one or both
houses were not in the control of the President's party.12 It may be
true that occasionally politics has entered into the consideration of
the question. This is not necessarily reprehensible and cannot be
foreclosed in a popular government. Politics has in fact played a minor
role since most treaties are adopted with relative speed and not on
party considerations. From 1899 to 1909 the Democrats controlled
less than one-third of the Senate. From 1932 to 1942 the Republicans
had the same experience. While the role of politics is minor, antagonism
to a particular President or Secretary of State accounts for some votes.
If the Constitution should now be changed making bare majorities
adequate, politics would be likely to become a much more important
factor in the consideration of treaties. If the two houses or the Presi-
dent did not all owe allegiance to the same party, the chances are that
the defeat of the President's treaties would become a political issue, a
fact which might defeat many treaties. The assumption that ratifica-
tion would by the amendment become much easier may be mistaken.1"
171. Id. at 317,338,346.
172. The condition of my remark, that one or both houses be not under the control of the
President's party, was essential to my statement. It is misrepresented by the gentlemen,
doubtless unwittingly, by the omission of the condition. McDougal and Lans, Treaties, at
190. See also, in debate, Mr. Baldwin (91 Cong. Rec., May 2, 1945, at 4129); Mr. Springer
(91 Cong. Rec., May 8, 1945, at 4399); Mr. Ludlow and Mr. Robsion (91 Cong. Rec., May 8,
1945, at 4407). Miss Sumner stated that the five-minute rule prohibited real debate in the
House (91 Cong. Rec., May 2, 1945, at 4131).
173. See Mr. Reed of Illinois, who believes that the new rule might slow up the con-
sideration of treaties, id. at 4138. See also Miss Summer, id. at 4131.
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Representative Ludlow of Indiana, in his address to the House of
Representatives, May 1, 1945,174 demonstrated that majority vote in
the two houses, when they are of the same party as the President, is no
check upon him at all. He showed how Mr. Farley, Postmaster
General in the second administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
was able by telephone to muster sufficient Democratic votes to defeat
by a narrow margin the Ludlow Resolution calling for a popular
referendum as a condition of declaring war. The administration usually
has at its disposal sufficient instruments of pressure to make a majority
under their party control subservient to its ishes. Much more difficult
is it to control two-thirds of the Senate, some of which must generally
be recruited from the minority party, even if partisan politics played
such an important role as Mr. Holt believes. 115
Representative Ludlow had shown in an earlier speech 170 that the
President's control of a majority in House and Senate by patronage
and other forms of influence is sufficient to disable these majorities from
furnishing the necessary checks to his executive power, so that mere
majority vote dispenses with that necessity for checks and balances
which the Founders sought to insure. Others showed that, far from
increasing legislative control, the substitution of a majority for the
two-thirds rule would decrease it.ln If now it should be contended
that the President alone has the power to make executive agreements of
all types in the entire field of foreign relations 178 and that an executive
agreement is interchangeable with a treaty, he alone can not only
change the statutes of Congress but amend the Constitution if he
finds a favorably disposed government, in Canada or Mexico or else-
where, to make an agreement to that effect.
If, on the other hand, we can conceive of the effectuation of the plan
for a Congressional-Executive agreement'17 as proposed by the gentle-
174. 91 Cong. Rec., May 1, 1945, at 4099. Representative Fellows raid: "Treat ratifica-
tion must not become a political football to be kicked around by a majority whethcr that
majority be Democratic or Republican. With the tvo-thirds rule for conent it ibecomes
necessary not only that a majority party concur but that a substantial number of the
minority also concur, and thus the treaty represents the desires of both major political
parties." 91 Cong. Rec., May 2, 1945, at4115.
175. See FARLEY, BEHmND =E B.ALLOTS (193S) 361, 362, quoted in 91 Cong. Rec.,
May 1, 1945, at 4100.
176. 91 Cong. Rec., March 2, 1945, app., at 1009.
177. Mr. Robsion, for eample, -aid that the resolution "adds greatly to the power of
the President and proportionately weakens the power of Congress." 91 Cong. Rec., May 2,
1945, at4119.
178. Attorney General Jackson in his opinion on the destroyer deal, August 27, 1940,
remarked that the President's power over foreign relations was "not unlimited" cince com-
mitments "as to the future" would impair powers vested in Congrez3. Such obligpticns
"are customarily" committed to treaty form "before the future legilative power iL com-
mitted." 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEsT OF INrERNATIO.AL. LAw, 405-6.
179. Mr. Hinshaw of California has introduced a resolution, ruled out of order in the
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men, constitutional amendments could be made with no greater diffi-
culty than are statutes, except that a foreign country must be found
to serve as a lay figure for an agreement. All the difficulty of amending
the Constitution could thus be avoided by the simple device of finding a
country willing to make an agreement and then adopting a joint resolu-
tion by majority vote in both houses.
As it happened, there was under discussion on the floor of the House
of Representatives on May 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9, 1945, the constitutional
amendment proposed by the House Judiciary Committee last Decem-
ber, making the House a participant in treaty-making by majority vote
of both houses. Few members appear to have attended the long debate,
a fact which The New York Times deplored.' Apparently not one
speaker advanced the thesis of the gentlemen under reply that a
Congressional-Executive agreement is already within the power of
Congress and that a constitutional amendment is not needed. Possibly
on account of the opposition, which includes an overwhelmingly
adverse vote of the New York State Bar Association,' the House
resolution was not brought to a vote. Instead, a compromise resolution
of Mr. Schwabe, making necessary the approval of a majority of the
membership of both houses, 218 in the House and 49 in the Senate, was
adopted 288 to 88, 56 not voting. 8 2 If the new rule should ever be
adopted, absence or nonvoting would be counted as a negative vote.
But what condemns to sterility the suggestion of a Congressional-
Executive agreement by which the Congress purportedly acts in ap-
proval of the President's agreement, and what makes it a dangerous
device for changing the form of the American Government, is that
majorities in Congress could thus, by the same majorities as are re-
quired for any statute, arrogate to themselves and drain away all state
power on any subject they felt disposed to control. Negotiable instru-
ments, commercial law, the law of contracts and torts, business units
and personal status could thus readily become Sederal powers by the
simple enactment of a joint resolution with Presidential cooperation.
Thus, the states could lose all their power whenever a favorable Con-
gress could be found. Can it really be supposed that three-quarters of
the states would ratify such a proposed amendment or that a favorable
majority in the Senate could be found, let alone the two-thirds neces-
sary for the proposal of a constitutional amendment? Or that it can
recent debate on the constitutional amendment, providing that, if a treaty is approved by
the Senate, it shall be sent to the House for passage if it deals with a subject within the
power of Congress. This is a novel idea which has not received any committee support. See
91 Cong. Rec., May 9, 1945, at 4438-40.
180. N.Y. Times, Editorial, May 9, 1945, p. 22, col. 2.
181. See Id. Jan.20,1945, p. 12, col. 6.
182. 91 Cong. Rec., May 9, 1945, at 4440.
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become a traditional practice without amendment? It seems incon-
ceivable.
No one would deny that the Constitution grows by gradual evolu-
tion, least of all a student of constitutional law. That is one reason it
has continued to exist with only a few amendments. But to admit this
is far from conceding the authors' thesis. Not only is there a difference
in the substantive and procedural clauses of the Constitution, but the
fact that some clauses have expanded, like the due process and inter-
state commerce clauses and others, is no reason why the treaty-making
clause has become obsolete and a new device, the executive agreement,
unmentioned in the Constitution, with or without Congress, has be-
come the overpowering instrumentality represented.
The last-ditch argument of those who oppose a constitutional prac-
tice they would improve upon is that the constitutional provision is
not "democratic." That is supposed to convince the doubter. If that
had anything to do with the issue, I suppose the whole Constitution
could be attacked as undemocratic, because the Founders did not too
much favor control by the general mass of the people, only some of
whom were voters in the separate states. But without using chame-
leonic terms, there is no reason why important questions should not
be decided by more than a simple majority. Until lately this argument
and the appeal to "democracy" in treaty-making, as in any other
matter requiring a two-thirds vote, was rarely heard. As several of the
House members suggested on May 1 and 2, 1945, if a voice for the
House in treaty-making is desired, why not require that two-thirds of
the House be added to the Senate tvo-thirds? '3 Until then, the Con-
stitution is not likely in this respect to be changed.
Charles Cheney Hyde, in discussing the recurrent proposals to strip
the Senate of its treaty-making power by substituting majorities, has
expressed himself as follows:
"The recourse to executive agreements revealed in the foregoing
sections, however impressive in scope and development, fails to
show that the Government has in fact acted on the theory that
the President, with or without the aid of Congress, may conclude in
behalf of the United States any arrangement which could be con-
cluded through the instrumentality of a treaty. There have been,
moreover, instances where a Secretary of State has felt that for pur-
poses of agreement the use of a treaty vas obligatory.
"At the time of the adoption of the Constitution treaties, them-
selves distinguishable under the then existing practice from ar-
rangements of lesser dignity, were the usual settings that were em-
ployed in the making of compacts of largest import and longest
endurance. This circumstance strengthens the view that the exact
183. The Springer amendment to this effect was voted down, 103 to 61. 91 Cong. RMe.,
May 9,1945, at 4415.
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provisions of the Constitution concerning the making of treaties
did more than prescribe the manner in which they were to be con-
cluded. The declaration that the President 'shall have Power by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur,' sustains the
conclusion that it was not to be rendered abortive by recourse to a
different procedure for the use of which no provision was made, and
that there were to be found tests of improper evasion in the char-
acter of what was sought to be achieved despite the absence of a
specific textual prohibition. Otherwise, the scheme for the co-
operative action of the President and the Senate would have been a
relatively valueless injunction, and the solitary constitutional
guide for contracting would have been of slight worth." 184
John Bassett Moore, the greatest authority in the field, authorized
the writer to say in a review of McClure's book, where the gentlemen's
thesis was first advocated, that Mr. Moore
"never intended by any of the passages quoted by Dr. McClure
to convey the opinion that any part of the treaty-making power
under the Constitution had been done away with or impaired by
practice; and that, without imputing to Dr. McClure any purpose
to misrepresent what he said, he thinks that the passages in ques-
tion, when read in connection with the context, do not sustain the
theory of constitutional dilapidation in support of which they are
cited." 185
We may conclude by another quotation from this wisest of statesmen.
Speaking of the so-called intelligentsia of the country, which he holds
largely responsible for foisting on the American people the theory of
"peace by force," collective punishment of "aggressors," and Executive
control or "leadership" in foreign affairs, John Bassett Moore says,
referring to the popular faith in the Kellogg Pact:
"The Pact no doubt makes a strong appeal to our intelligentsia,
easily the most emotional and most voluble and, as I often think, so
far as concerns the realities of international life, the most unin-
formed, the most injudicious and the most susceptible to propa-
ganda." 186
184. 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d rev. ed. 1945) 1416-7.
185. Quoted in Borchard, Book Review [of MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS (1941) ] (1942) 42 COL. L. REV. 887, 890.
186. 7 COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN BASSETr MOORE (1944) 22.
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